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ABSTRACT 
 
Natural resources can be a solution to the capital deficit in sub Saharan Africa. As 
such, resource rich countries have to avoid plundering and wastage of the resource 
rents. However, the nature of politics in the region points to the fact that 
plundering of resource rents is inevitable because most resource rich sub Saharan 
African countries have been prone to elite capture and bad governance. This 
entails that national resources are “privatised” in the sense that they are directed 
towards enrichment of a few. In addition, governments in resource rich countries 
tend to allocate resource rents inefficiently. Thus, resources do not contribute 
towards sustainable and long-term development. To avoid plundering and wastage, 
a set of institutions can be put in place that can assist in managing resource rents. 
These are institutions that can restrain ruling elites from capturing the resource 
rents for private use and the state from inefficiently allocating rents through 
policies. Most scholars argue that a democratic system, through frequent elections 
and its attendant institutions such as the rule of law, accountability and 
transparency allows effective and efficient management resource rents and the 
economy in general. This is a good starting point in conceptualising institutions of 
restraint. However, this study seeks to broaden our understanding of institutions 
of restraint by providing an alternative approach.   
 
Using Botswana and Namibia as case studies this study seeks to reconceptualise 
institutions of restraint without rejecting the importance of democratic institutions. 
The study considers the hypothesis that the success in management of resource 
rents, particularly in Botswana, can be explained by a combination of democratic 
institutions and what can be termed centralised development planning institutions. 
The premise of this proposition is that democratic institutions are inadequate in 
restraining elites or the state. Therefore, they need to be complemented by 
centralised development planning institutions. Working in tandem, democratic 
institutions and centralised development planning institutions have the capacity to 
adequately provide the necessary restraints in resource driven economies. In line 
with this, the study argues that the degree or level of restraints in a political system 
is essential for successful management of resource rents.  
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
 
With the increasing discovery of natural resources across sub Saharan Africa 
(SSA)1, proponents of resources led development argue for the establishment of 
institutions that will assist resource rich countries to manage their resources 
effectively and efficiently. They identify Botswana as the model for successful 
management of natural resources. Botswana has been one of the fastest growing 
economies regardless of its dependency diamonds. In addition, it has been one of 
the stable democracies in SSA. Accordingly, most recommendations for SSA 
countries rich in natural resources are based on emulating institutional 
arrangements that Botswana adopted. Mainly, Botswana’s market orientation is 
cited as essential for the success it has registered. This study contends that 
Botswana’s interventionist approach circumscribed by institutions of restraints 
better account for its success. In other words, the degree of political accountability 
is more important in resource economies rather than market orientation. To 
illustrate this, the study will use Botswana and introduce Namibia as a comparator 
case. Namibia is an understudied natural resource rich country that has been 
relatively successful in managing its natural resources. Arguably, including Namibia 
in this study will be a notable contribution.  
 
Institutions of restraint are usually equated to democratic institutions: rule of law, 
accountability and transparency. Contrary to this perspective, this study argues that 
democratic institutions can be inadequate in providing restraints and what is 
required is a combination of democratic institutions and centralised development 
planning institutions (CDPIs) or hegemonic economic agencies.  Institutions of 
restraint are meant to inhibit plundering of resource rents through corruption, 
rent-seeking2 and patronage politics. Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) who produce the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) define corruption as the exercise of 
public power for private gain, including both ‘petty and ‘grand’ corruption, as well 
as ‘capture’ of state activities by elites for their own interests and profit.  Yan Kong 
(2004: 343) define corruption as the use of public resources (resource rents in this 
case) and power for particularistic purposes and interests. Arguably, the definitions 
above capture economic corruption (malfeasance motivated by financial benefit) 
and political corruption (malfeasance motivated by power).  
 																																																								
1 In some instances it must be read as sub Saharan African (countries).  
2 For a detailed discussion on how rent-seeking can be socially or economically costly see 
Mehlum et al 2006.  
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Rent-seeking can take many forms. Generally, rent-seeking is socially costly pursuit 
of rents (Svennson 2005: 21). In line with this definition, pursuit of resource rents 
by various actors can directly or indirectly undermine the overall performance of 
the economy by depriving it of investment. Patronage is the use or diversion of 
public resources to individuals or a small group of people to ensure the incumbent 
ruling elites maintain or retains political power. It can also involve vote buying 
during elections Noteworthy is that corruption, rent-seeking and patronage can 
interact and reinforce each other in various ways. Institutions of restraint can 
inhibit these practices but also they potentially set the parameters within which a 
developmental state functions and pursues its objectives. Nonetheless, the political 
and economic context determines the functioning of institutions of restraint. As 
such, it is possible to find a symbiotic relationship between democratic institutions 
and CDPIs that are often argued to be inherently incompatible. The main aim of 
this study is to critically assess the institutional arrangements that most scholars 
cite as responsible for success in Botswana and to some extent Namibia.  
 
Recent research and literature on resource governance present evidence that lend 
support to the proposition that democracy has the potential to avoid the 
plundering and wastage of resource rents.  It is argued that a democratic system 
has the capacity to restrain both political elites and the state (Arezki and Gylfason 
2013, Bhattacharyya and Holder 2010). Through frequent elections and its 
attendant institutions such as the rule of law, accountability and transparency 
(democratic institutions from now on) a democratic system, allows effective and 
efficient management of national resources. In other words, without any 
overarching political system that has rule of law, accountability and transparency 
inbuilt it is difficult for institutions of restraint or a restraining framework to 
emerge. This argument does have merits but does not take into account that the 
management of natural resource requires a robust restraining framework that 
democratic institutions alone cannot provide. Relatedly, the inadequacy of 
democratic institutions is apparent when one takes into account the need to utilise, 
allocate and distribute resource rents. Therefore, a robust restraining framework 
can be attained by a combination of democratic institutions and CDPIs. Taking 
into account a combination of democratic institutions and CDPIs the study seeks 
to reconceptualise institutions of restraint.  
 
To reconceptualise institutions of restraint, this study utilises Botswana and 
Namibia, which have performed very well on democratic and economic indicators; 
and have managed to avoid the resource curse that is associated with dependence 
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on natural resources. What most scholars do not pay attention to are the 
differences in how democracy as a political system functions in different countries. 
This difference influences institutional building and configuration. One of the 
objectives of this study is to illustrate how political and economic settings 
determine or facilitate the development of institutions for resource governance. 
The political and economic setting imbues institutions with their form and quality; 
and with their design and purpose. In addition, this setting determines the 
functionality, effectiveness and efficiency of institutions. Hence, before one looks 
at how institutions function one needs to examine the political and economic 
setting that allows them to function the way they do. Instead of generalising which 
institutions countries should adopt for resource governance, political economists 
and policymakers must understand the political and economic setting to determine 
the most appropriate institutions. Furthermore, the economic and political setting 
affects the robustness of democratic institutions. In accordance with this, the study 
seeks to build a different theoretical framework of institutions of restraint that goes 
beyond the democratic perspective.  
 
Another sphere that political economists have not paid much attention to is 
resource rents driven developmental states. Leftwich (1995: 401) defines 
developmental states as “states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, 
autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the 
achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and 
promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organising it 
directly, or a varying combination of both.” This study seeks to illustrate that 
developmental states can effectively function within constraints yet managing to 
produce the intended results. The study focuses on the institutional arrangements 
that permit CPDIs to complement democratic institutions. Yet, it is generally 
argued that due to their bureaucratic nature, CDPIs might not be compatible with 
democratic institutions. As a result, it has prompted proponents of the democratic 
approach to argue that democratic institutions are meant to limit the use of CDPIs 
by ruling elites to pursue unsustainable macroeconomic policies. In addition, it is 
argued that democratic institutions are meant to reduce opportunities for the 
diversion of state resources to corruption, rent-seeking and to finance patronage 
politics. Respectively, proponents of CDPIs contend that democratic institutions 
should not be restraining so much that they prevent the use of state power for the 
pursuit of developmental objectives. This suggests that these institutions cannot 
coexist. Nonetheless, this study argues that tension might exist between these two 
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sets of institutions but they can coexist and there is no inherent contradiction in 
their coexistence as they can reinforce each other.  
 
With the capacity to reinforce each other, democratic institutions and CPDIs can 
be linked to ensure that resource rents are managed effectively and efficiently. The 
process of reinforcing each other and working in tandem provides a restraining 
environment within which a developmental state has to operate. This restraining 
framework hinders the plundering of resource rents. Thus this study attempts to 
reveal the conditions under which democratic institutions work in tandem with 
CDPIs to produce a robust restraining framework in which a developmental state 
can pursue its objectives. From this theoretical entry, the study seeks to provide an 
institutional analysis of the two case studies: how institutions of restraint operate 
similarly and differently in Botswana and Namibia. Moreover, it provides an in 
depth analysis on how the political and economic setting can give further insights 
into the conditions which allow the establishment of institutions and why some 
countries establish them and others choose not to. Exploring these different 
dimensions of institutional development is crucial for understanding how resource 
governance can take different pathways or formulas. These different pathways and 
formulas can reveal the institutional arrangements that can be implemented in 
other countries without being prescriptive while leaving room for innovation and 
adaptation.  
 
From the above discussion it is apparent that one needs a conditional explanation 
to understand why and what kind of institutions have been established to manage 
and allocate resource rents. In other words institutions and policies differ from one 
country to another. As argued earlier, their difference can be explained by the 
political and economic setting. To guide this study, a few interlinked questions 
have to be laid out. First, has democracy produced a robust set of democratic 
institutions (rule of law, accountability and transparency) in the two cases? Second, 
what prompts CDPIs to be established? Lastly and more important, why and 
under what conditions do democratic institutions and CDPIs reinforce each other 
to provide a restraining framework. In short, how do these two sets of institutions 
function together as institutions of restraint?  
 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Chapter two is a review of literature 
and will focus on the interaction of resource rents with democracy, corruption, 
rent-seeking, patronage and institutions. This will be linked to the role of 
institutions and economic performance. Another area the review will discuss is 
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related to the construction of developmental states and resource rents driven 
developmental states. A short Chapter three follows which outlines the analytical 
framework and the case selection. Using an analytic narrative, Chapter four will 
introduce Botswana and the discussion will centre on how the successful 
management of resource rents can be explained by an interaction of democratic 
institutions and CPDIs. It will attempt to demonstrate that democracy and its 
attendant institutions cannot adequately explain the success. Chapter five will 
discuss Namibia, while applying the same approach but looking at differences and 
similarities of the institutions of restraints. Chapter six will be a brief discussion 
and will also provide some concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER TWO.THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESOURCE 
RENTS 
 
Most countries rich in natural resources depend on the performance of their 
extractive industry for economic growth. The revenues from these resources are a 
source of capital, which can be invested to induce long-term economic growth. As 
a result of this growth the welfare of society can improve. Alternatively, revenues 
from the extractive industry can be invested in public goods that can unlock or aid 
economic growth. Auty (2001a: 80) points out that management of resource rents 
should be divided into two components: income component and capital 
component. The capital component should be invested constantly, either 
domestically or overseas to maintain the income component of the rent stream in 
perpetuity for future use or generations (Auty 2001a: 80). However, the process of 
capturing (including the method), utilising and allocating resource rents can be very 
challenging (Lewis 1989: 1558). I will term this process the rent process from now. 
This challenge stems from two sources. First, the ownership structure of natural 
resources in most resource rich countries puts the state at the centre of the rent 
process. This creates opportunities for corruption, rent-seeking and patronage 
politics to occur. The levels of corruption, rent-seeking and patronage affect 
economic performance. Second, resource rents are easily lootable particularly 
where there are weak state institutions. As a result resources are diverted away 
from developmental objectives or provision of welfare-enhancing public goods. 
 
In the literature on the political resource curse there is general consensus that 
corruption, rent-seeking and patronage politics are more likely to occur in non-
democratic resource rich countries due to the absence of democratic institutions. 
The assumption is that democracy provides an overarching basis for institutions of 
restraint to emerge.  Without any overarching system that establishes rule of law, 
accountability and transparency, it is argued that institutions that have a restraining 
capacity cannot emerge. As such, democracy is viewed as essential in solving the 
challenges faced in the rent process. Causal Diagram 1 below represents this 
perspective. It shows how an interaction of democracy and resource rents can 
result in the emergence of institutions of restraint. In other words, an injection of 
resource rents in a democratic system can prompt the emergence of institutions of 
restraint.  
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Causal Diagram 1. The Democratic Approach 
 
 
 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, other scholars contend that a democracy is inadequate in providing the 
restraints required to curb corruption, rent-seeking and patronage politics. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2005) argue that democracy does not guarantee that revenues from 
natural resources will be managed effectively and efficiently. Therefore, there is 
need to develop institutions that buttress the restraining capacity of democratic 
institutions. This perspective informs the argument that this study proposes: that 
corruption, rent-seeking and patronage politics are practices that require 
institutions that go beyond rule of law, transparency and accountability. 
Accordingly, what is required are institutions that craft and implement policies 
Resource	Rents	 Democracy	
Institutions	of	Restraint	
Economic	Outcomes	
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essential for attaining economic growth and for ensuring effective and efficient 
allocation of resource rents.  Therefore, the argument advanced is that CDPIs are 
essential for curbing corruption, rent seeking, patronage politics and attaining 
desirable economic outcomes. In short, it proposes an interaction of democratic 
institutions and CDPIs. By inserting CDPIs into the equation, the study seeks to 
reconceptualise institutions of restraint. Causal Diagram 2 below represents what 
can be term a “Hybrid approach” to understanding institutions of restraint. 
 
Causal Diagram 2. The Hybrid Approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The causal diagrams above represent the different pathways through which 
institutions of restraint emerge. Causal Diagram 1 illustrates the conventional 
“Democratic Approach” to the emergence of institutions of restraint. It shows the 
simultaneous interaction of resource rents and democracy. This interaction 
Resource	Rents	
CDPIs	Democracy	
Institutions	of	Restraint	
Economic	Outcomes	
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determines the restraints that emerge. Causal Diagram 2 illustrates the approach 
that this study seeks to advance. The “Hybrid Approach” takes into account the 
importance of democratic institutions but inserts CDPIs into the process. 
Alternatively, there is a simultaneous interaction of resource rents, democratic 
institutions and CDPIs. Most scholars, take it is a given that CDPIs will function 
within the parameters set by democracy but in some instances and at the expense 
of democratic accountability they can function outside the democratic logic. 
Accordingly, they interact with democratic institutions in ways that allows a 
complementary relationship to emerge. This relationship allows the emergence of a 
restraining framework that I argue explain Botswana’s success in managing 
resource rents.  
 
Resource rents, Democracy and Patronage Politics 
 
This section discusses the interaction of democracy and resources rents and the 
possible outcomes of this interaction. The section is concerned with whether 
resources rents cement or undermine democratic institutions and processes such as 
elections. To understand the impact of resource rents one can utilise the rentier 
state thesis as a vantage point. The rentier state thesis suggests that when a state 
acquires most its revenues from exporting natural resources it can afford not to 
heavily tax its citizens. This is the “taxation effect” (Ross 2001: 332). As a result of 
the taxation effect, the state become less accountable to the society it presides over 
(Ross 1999: 312). The second category of explanations revolves around what can 
be termed the “spending effect” (Ross 2001: 333). Due to availability of resource 
rents, the state can afford to increase expenditure towards public goods. However, 
this increase can be motivated by patronage concerns, that is spending directed 
towards key constituencies to allow politicians to retain their power (Isham et al 
2005: 147). In democratic countries, the provision of patronage undermines 
democratic processes such as elections as voting buying becomes part of the 
electoral process. Vote buying financed by resource rents can lead to the 
emergence of patronage politics (this will discussed in more detail below). In other 
cases the spending of resource rents, particularly in non-democratic countries is 
meant to legitimise the ruling elite. In either case resource rents undermine 
democracy or inhibit the transition to democracy (Ross 2001). One can safely 
conclude that, resource rents can enable states to evade democratic institutions 
that are crucial for the emergence of institutions of restraint. 
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The case studies used in this study are all democracies; therefore it is essential to 
discuss in detail the implications of resource rents on democracy. As already 
alluded to above, resource rents can result in the emergence of patronage politics 
that distort democratic processes. The availability of resource rents makes staying 
in power more attractive. On one hand staying in power allows politicians to have 
access to rents for private enrichment or opportunities for rent-seeking. On the 
other hand, an injection of resource rents raises the value of being in power as they 
provide resources that can be used to influence election outcomes (Robinson et al 
2006: 450, Kolstad and Soreide 2009: 217). Consequently, this has implications on 
how politicians attract voters or how governments acquire power and how they 
use it. One way of influencing election outcomes is through vote buying and 
providing patronage that is financed by resource rents (Collier and Hoeffler 2009). 
Vote buying and providing patronage distorts the electoral process and allows the 
ruling elite to have unaccountable power. With the establishment of unaccountable 
power, checks and balances that should be provided by democratic institutions are 
eroded. In the literature, there is an explicit assumption that checks and balances 
that function through transparency and accountability are inherent in a democracy. 
Yet, scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler  (2005: 633) argue that such checks and 
balances can only be provided if the society is prompted to do so through taxation. 
This argument is linked to the taxation effect discussed above. What is important 
to highlight is that resource rents can finance patronage politics that distort 
electoral process. As a result, this undermines democracy and its institutions. 
 
Another consequence of voting buying and patronage politics is reduced or the 
absence of electoral competition. Electoral competition is often argued to be 
essential in restraining politicians from engaging in patronage politics (Bueno de 
Mesqiuta et al 2002). Facing electoral competition, the incumbent government has 
limitations on how far it can go in supporting one group or constituency over 
others. In addition, without political competition (that has been eroded by 
patronage politics) it is hard for democratic institutions to restrain the government 
from misusing resource rents. Noteworthy is that it is not certain that natural 
resources will have a positive or negative impact on democracy and its institutions. 
In some cases it might not have any effect at all. This leaves one to conclude that 
the effect of natural resources on democracy is largely contextual. Hence, one of 
the objectives of the study is to assess whether resource rents have had a positive 
or negative impact on democracy in Botswana and Namibia. With both countries 
having dominant parties for more than 20 years it is worthwhile to assess whether 
resource rents have been used to consolidate the incumbent governments or not. 
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In addition, due limited electoral competition within dominant party systems, how 
did democratic institutions perform or which institutions restrained the 
governments from misusing resource rents. As put forward earlier: does 
democracy and its attendant institutions adequately explain the success in resource 
management in these countries? Or what is required is an explanation that takes 
into account CDPIs.   
 
Resource Rents, Corruption and Rent-Seeking 
 
The discussion in this section is guided by the proposition that an injection of 
resources rents into a political economy introduces various incentives and 
opportunities for different actors in any political system, democratic or non-
democratic. These actors include individual politicians, the government and private 
entrepreneurs. The current discussion is centred on how availability of resource 
rents creates opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking. Effective and efficient 
allocation of resource rents is crucial if a state is interested in providing public 
goods that support the overall performance of the economy. To a larger extent, 
such a process requires direct and centralised control of resource revenues by the 
state. However, this raises questions about corruption and rent-seeking. In most 
resource rich countries direct and centralised control of resource rents is meant to 
make corruption and rent-seeking easier (McFerson 2010). In line with such 
concerns, a number of studies have been conducted to establish whether there is a 
relationship between an increase in resource rents and the levels of corruption and 
rent seeking. Let us first look at corruption. 
 
The various transmission channels of the effects of resource rents on corruption 
have led to differentiated results, if not ambiguous. In their study, Bhattacharyya 
and Holder (2010) consider whether resource rents breed corruption. Their 
assessment takes into account that the level of democracy and soundness of 
democratic institutions can influence the level of corruption. Their basic premise is 
that if an incumbent government can stay in office without high levels of political 
support it will lead to more corruption in a context of abundant resource rents 
(Bhattacharyya and Holder 2010: 608). This is because resource rents are less 
sensitive to corruption than domestic production or trade. Hence, resource rents 
can be easily appropriated (Bhattacharyya and Holder 2010: 609). This is not 
necessarily the case in countries with better democratic institutions. The overall 
conclusion is that the effect of resource rents on corruption depends on the quality 
of democratic institutions. In other words, there is a certain threshold at which 
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resources rents can breed or feed into corruption. Arezki and Gylfason (2013) 
focus on whether the impact of oil rents on corruption is independent of political 
systems. In other words, do political systems affect corruption and good 
governance in SSA? Using the period between 1985 and 2007, their findings lend 
support to the argument that higher resource rents lead to more corruption and 
the effect is stronger in less democratic countries (Arezki and Gylfason 2013: 554). 
Their findings and conclusions suggest that in a democratic system there are 
checks and balances that can prevent the squandering of resource revenues. 
 
Instead of viewing corruption as a process that only emerges when resource rents 
are injected into a political economy, it is crucial to understand the patterns and 
levels of corruption as determined by the ownership structure of natural resources. 
Some strategies of corruption can be built into ownership structures. Previous 
decisions on the development and extraction of natural resources also have an 
effect on corruption. Kolstad and Soreide (2009: 221) argue that the design of the 
revenue system, rules about cost recovery, and industrial tax allowances are prone 
to corruption. These pre-development phases of natural resources can easily 
determine the ways in which corruption can be conducted when revenues start to 
flow into government coffers. Arguably, even though there are vibrant democratic 
institutions, the pre-development decisions made by governments can make 
corruption difficult to detect. In addition, complicated, non-transparent and 
sometimes contradictory or ambiguous regulations can create opportunities for 
bureaucratic discretion (Kolstad and Soreide 2009: 221). Such discretion can create 
opportunities for corruption and rent seeking to take place. Relatedly, this 
discretion decreases the quality of government and in turn affects economic 
performance. The arguments above provide us with an entry point into a 
discussion on rent-seeking. 
 
It is often argued that rent-seeking has more negative effects on the overall 
performance of the economy than corruption. The logic of the argument is that 
resource rents are squandered through rent-seeking instead of being invested into 
more productive activities. In many developing countries that are rich in resources, 
rent-seeking becomes an occupation for some entrepreneurs. Resultantly, the 
resource sector does not create backward and forward linkages with the rest of the 
economy due to rent-seeking. Mehlum et al (2006) attempt to understand the 
variance of growth performance among resource rich countries. Mehlum et al’s 
(2006) starting point is that the variance in growth performance can be explained 
by how resource rents are distributed through the institutional arrangements that 
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exist in a political economy. On one hand there can be institutions that are 
producer friendly where rent-seeking and production complement each other 
(Mehlum et al 2006: 3). On the other hand there are grabber friendly institutions 
where rent-seeking and production are competing activities (Mehlum et al 2006: 3). 
Grabber friendly institutions exist due to weak democratic institutions and a 
malfunctioning bureaucracy (Mehlum et al 2006: 3). They do not necessarily 
specify what kind of political system is more prone to grabber institutions. Their 
main concern is institutional quality. These grabber friendly institutions can emerge 
in democratic and non-democratic systems. With the possibilities of rent-seeking 
complementing production activities it allows one to start to think about how 
resources rich countries can perform much better even without sound democratic 
institutions. This implies that what is required are institutions that inhibit rent-
seeking that does not complement production activities or that is detrimental to 
the economy as whole. 
 
The observations above do not take into consideration the interaction of 
corruption and rent-seeking. Rent-seeking models are based on the assumption 
that resource rents are relatively easy to appropriate (Butle et al 2005: 1031). In 
turn, it leads to corruption, bribes, distortions in public policies and a diversion of 
labour away from productive activities to seeking public favours (Butle et al 2005: 
1031). Butle et al (2005) points to the possibilities of rent-seeking determining the 
levels of corruption. Instead of viewing corruption as determined by the mere 
existence of resource rents, rent-seeking can be another determinant at work. The 
availability of resource rents can result in an increase of rent-seeking behaviour that 
in turn can have an effect on the levels of corruption (Leite and Weidmann 1999). 
These processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible for rent-
seeking and corruption to reinforce each other or interact in ways that lead to an 
increase in levels of the other. 
 
Resource rents, Institutions and Economic Performance 
 
In explaining economic outcomes, there is consensus that institutions matter. This 
is definitely crucial in resource rich countries as resource rents can have an impact 
on institutions or institutional development. Pioneering work by Sachs and Warner 
(1997) on the natural resource curse resulted in a wave of research that attempted 
to understand how natural resources can slow down economic growth. Many 
scholars have attempted to understand the channels through which natural 
resources can lead to economic stagnation. One area that has received attention is 
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institutional context. Abundance of resource rents can shape the institutional 
context that in turn determines economy performance. Leite and Weidmann 
(2002) illustrated that there is no direct effect of resource wealth (read rents) on 
economic performance but there is an indirect effect. This indirect effect works 
through the levels of corruption that affect economic performance. Levels of 
corruption are an indication of the quality of institutions. Robinson et el’s (2006) 
political economy model demonstrates that the impact of an injection of huge 
resource rents largely depends on the quality of political institutions and the degree 
of clientelism in the public sector. According to their model these variables have an 
impact on economic performance. 
 
Scholars such as Luong and Weinthal (2006: 243) argue that institutional quality or 
capacity in resource rich countries is not necessarily determined by the resource 
rents, but by the ownership structure that each country adopts over its mineral 
resources. The interaction of a political system, democratic or non-democratic, 
with the resource rents does not have an effect on the institutions that emerge or 
their capacity. Contrary to most perspectives the political system has an effect on 
the ownership structure that will in turn determine the design and the capacity of 
institutions (Luong and Weinthal 2006: 243). In line with this argument, the 
ownership structure determines the institutions of restraint that might be adopted. 
This is not to say that the political system does not have an effect in the process. 
Rather, the proposition is that its effects are more pronounced in the phase where 
the country is choosing the method to develop its resources (the ownership 
structure) that will in turn determine the institutions that manage resource rents 
and the economy. 
 
From an assessment of ownership structure in petroleum rich countries, Luong 
and Weinthal (2006: 244-245) identify four ownership structures: state ownership 
with control, state ownership without control, private domestic ownership and 
private foreign ownership. The type of ownership structure fosters different 
incentives for institutional building as different actors are involved and different 
state-business relations are established (Luong and Weinthal 2006: 246). For 
instance, in cases of state ownership with control (which a huge section of the 
literature posits is prevalent in most resource rich countries) the main actors are 
political elites and bureaucrats. Business-state relations are blurred and 
symmetrical, and their incentives for building discretionary institutions are likely to 
converge (Luong and Weinthal 2006: 246). Thus, institutions are likely to be weak 
in predictability, scope, and ability to restrain (Luong and Weinthal 2006: 246). As 
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a result, corruption and rent-seeking can be pervasive in the management of 
resource rents. It suffices to argue that weak institutions of restraint are not a 
product of the interaction of a political system and resource rents per se, but rather 
a product of which actors owns them and controls their development. Plausibly, 
these actors are crucial in the establishment of institutions of restraint. 
 
Resource Rents and Developmental States 
 
The socio-political setting in SSA countries rich in mineral resources is such that 
performance of the resource sector has huge implications on the political sphere. 
This is due to dependence on the natural resource sector for overall economic 
performance. As such booms and busts caused by price fluctuations of 
commodities in international markets have to be managed with caution. Ensuring 
that resource rents are not wasted is especially important during a boom. However, 
one of the challenges that most SSA governments have to contend with is the 
management of the proceeds from mineral exploitation or resource rents. Effective 
management and efficient allocation of resource rents is crucial if a state is 
interested in diversifying the economy away from resource dependence, alleviating 
poverty or channeling the rents to support an infant manufacturing industry. This 
process of utilising rents requires an activist state that intervenes in the economy. 
This can be in the form of a developmental political state, of which a 
developmental state is a variant (Auty 2001b). 
 
Developmental states or any form of state driven developmentalism that is based 
on direct intervention in the economy is generally viewed as ineffective. From a 
neoliberal perspective that emphasises the importance of a self regulating market, 
the state’s role should be limited to enforcing property rights and providing public 
goods that would support the activities of a private sector. In addition, the market 
will regulate itself and allow allocative efficiency to take place. In line with this, a 
lot of critics have pointed out that a state is not an effective and efficient 
instrument for allocating resources in an economy. For instance, a common 
critique of the developmental state is that resources in the form of loans were 
channeled to industries that were not productive. Such inefficient allocation of 
resources has implications on the overall performance of the economy. 
Nevertheless, most political elites in SSA view the state as a key player in economic 
transformation. This is in part influenced by the success of the developmental state 
is East Asia that managed to forcefully intervene in the economy and create 
vibrant manufacturing industries without natural resources to fund this process. 
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Through that process huge sections of the population were lifted out of poverty. 
However, direct state intervention in the economy raises questions of corruption, 
rent seeking and other practices that result in the plundering of resources rents. 
 
Resource rents can be a solution to capital deficit for most resource rich SSA 
countries. Accordingly, resource rich SSA countries have to avoid plundering the 
resource rents. On one hand, the main issue is whether resource rich SSA 
countries have the capacity to capture and recycle resource rents into domestic 
capital that can be used to diversify away from resource dependence. Relatedly, 
how can resource rich countries consume some of the rents efficiently in the form 
of provision welfare enhancing public goods without rapidly exhausting them. 
Moreover, it is widely accepted that most SSA states with resources are prone to 
elite capture. In these cases national resources are “privatised” in the sense that 
they are directed towards particularistic purposes and interests. These concerns are 
heightened when the state is directly involved in the rent process. The concerns 
stem from possibilities of a fusion between the state and the incumbent political 
party. This is more pronounced in dominant party democracies as this fusion can 
lead to corruption, rent-seeking and patronage politics. The question that needs to 
be asked is whether democracy and its attendant institutions can adequately 
account for the success in the two case studies deployed in this study. 
 
Efficient allocation of resource rents, in resource rich countries has the potential of 
unlocking or aiding economic growth. As mentioned above, a developmental state 
can be a mechanism for efficient allocation of resource rents. Without repeating 
much, as the title of the research suggests there is need to restraint a 
developmental state: that is, its pursuit for economic development should be 
restrained. The logic behind this proposition is that centralised economic planning 
can be distorted to create opportunities for corruption, rent seeking and patronage 
activities. Corruption, rent-seeking and patronage produce states with state-society 
relations based on constituency clientelism, a bureaucracy that succumbs to social 
demands, a distributive fiscal policy and patterns of state economic intervention 
motivated by the need to provide side payments (patronage) rather than 
maximising economic development (Waldner 1999: 37). Such attributes are not 
conducive to efficient allocation of resource rents that can drive long-term 
economic development. However, how has the ruling elite particularly in Botswana 
and to some extent in Namibia, been able to construct a developmental state, 
which functions within parameters, yet still manage to effectively pursue its 
developmental objectives?  
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Democracy and the Construction of Developmental States 
 
The previous sections have discussed recent literature on the benefits of 
democracy to the management of resources. However, a heterodox perspective on 
economic development argues that democracy can actually be detrimental to 
economic performance due to incentives it introduces. One of these incentives is 
short-termism amongst political elites. This short-termism encourages incumbent 
political elites to focus more on consumption to keep voters happy as a strategy 
for political survival. In resource economies various groups can lobby for the 
consumption of resource rents. Consequently, this diverts resources away from 
investment that is essential for long-term economic growth. These arguments have 
been presented to support the incompatibility of democracy and a developmental 
state (of which the Asian version was presided over by benevolent authoritarian 
regimes) or state directed developmentalism. Political elites in Botswana seem to 
have managed to construct developmental states while maintaining a democratic 
system.  
To answer the question that was posed at the end of the last section, one has to 
borrow some theoretical insights developed to explain how ruling elites in East 
Asian managed to construct developmental states. A good starting point is 
Waldner’s (1999) proposition in “State Building and Late Development”. 
Waldner’s (1999) vantage point is about elite conflict within a political system and 
how it determines the political-economic institutions that emerge. Waldner (1999) 
argues that developmental states emerged in Taiwan and South Korea (comparing 
with Syria and Turkey) because of an absence of high levels of elite conflict. This is 
whereby another elite group threatens an incumbent ruling elite. The conflict 
results in the mobilisation of popular support or building of cross-class coalitions 
by the incumbent ruling elites as a means of providing a social base and 
consolidating its rule. Contending elites mobilise popular support to create a social 
base.  
 
Cross-class coalitions created by the incumbent regime are based on side 
payments, which produce states with state-society relations based on constituency 
clientelism, a bureaucracy that succumbs to social demands, a distributive fiscal 
policy and patterns of state economic intervention motivated by the need to 
provide side payments rather than maximising economic development (Waldner 
1999: 37). Elite conflict results in incumbent regimes focusing on political survival 
at the expense of economic development. In South Korea and Taiwan there was 
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low elite conflict and the incumbent regimes were not politically threatened. 
Accordingly, this gave them room to construct developmental states with the 
resources that were available. 3  In sum, the logic of the argument is that, a 
combination of state building and coalition building determines the attributes of 
the resulting political-economic institutions (Waldner 1999: 2).  
 
In line with this argument, one can argue that political elites in Botswana and 
Namibia managed to build developmental states due the absence of elite conflict. 
A weak opposition has also contributed to low levels of elite conflict. Molutsi and 
Holm (1990) argue that the opposition in Botswana has been weak and 
disorganised. As result, this has allowed the ruling Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) to dominate the political landscape. Good (1994) adds that since 
independence there have not been opposition parties and social movements. 
Without any political threat it has been relatively easy to construct a developmental 
state in Botswana. In addition, the creation of a developmental state was inevitable 
in Botswana as ruling elite were convinced that direct state intervention in the 
economy and central planning was essential for unlocking economic growth and 
providing welfare enhancing public goods (Eriksen 2011: 6). Therefore, post 
independence economic transformation had to be directed by the state.  
 
In Namibia, South West Africa’s Organisation (SWAPO) has dominated the 
political landscape since the end of apartheid. As such the existence of a dominant 
party for over 20 years is indicative of the absence of elite conflict and suggests 
that the incumbent elites are politically secure. With political security, the elites 
have focused on long-term economic development without having to worry about 
political survival. Political security can result in ruling elites being tempted to 
plunder resource rents.  A combination of political security and the size of the 
ruling elites can determine how the ruling elites distribute resource rents. Collier 
and Venables (2009) argue that when the ruling elite is small, the incentive is to 
distribute rents towards itself. Yet, in Botswana and to some degree in Namibia, 
this has not been the case. The elites have focused more on utilising resource rents 																																																								
3 For a critique of Waldner’s (1999) proposition see Doner et al (2005). I have also used 
Waldner’s (1999) exposition and that of Doner et al (2005) to understand the emergence of 
“Developmental Regimes” in Rwanda and Ethiopia in a dissertation titled “Systemic 
Vulnerability and the Emergence of Developmental Regimes in Africa: Comparative analysis of 
Rwanda and Ethiopia” (2015 at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London). For a general discussion on developmental states and the definition of a developmental 
state in relation to Africa see Mkandawire Thandika (2001).  
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efficiently and effectively. An important question to consider is which institutions 
have assisted in the efficient and effective utilization of resource rents?  
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CHAPTER THREE. MODELLING INSTITUTIONS OF RESTRAINT 
 
Having discussed the literature and the main arguments that the study will advance. 
This section will provide the analytical framework: that is the independent 
variables and dependent variables. The variables will be operationalised 
qualitatively. In addition, the section will provide the case selection. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The variables are potential institutions of restraint and have the potential to inhibit 
state and resource capture by political elites. They are also CDPIs, which 
coordinate the rent process, the crafting and implementation of developmental 
policies. CDPIs are part of the state bureaucracy and in many cases they play a 
hegemonic role. 
 
1 Democratic Institutions: these will be operationalised as the robustness of rule 
of law, accountability and transparency within the political system of the two cases. 
They have the potential of restraining the state or those in charge of the state from 
making decisions that are motivated by political survival. Accordingly, the 
democratic institutions can ensure decisions are made in the interest of society.  
Moreover, this minimises corruption, rent-seeking or use of resource rents to fund 
patronage politics. To assess and measure the robustness of democratic 
institutions, a number of indications can be utilised. However, this study will rely 
on Kaufmann and Kraay’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).4  
 
The WGI uses a percentile ranking on the different dimensions of governance. 
Countries are ranked by percentile, with higher values indicating better ratings. For 
example, a percentile of 70 on a given dimension means that 70% of countries 
worldwide score worse, and 30% score better, than the country in question. Thus, 
the higher the number, the better the situation on that particular dimension. 
Regardless of its comprehensiveness it has to be complemented by secondary data 
due to limited time frames. I will also use secondary data such as journals, books 
and research papers to trace and assess the robustness of democratic institutions 
overtime. The robustness of democratic institutions has implications on 																																																								
4 “These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and 
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries.  They are based on over 30 
individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms” (Kaufmann and Kraay 
2016).  
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governance 5  and government effectiveness (see definition of government 
effectiveness below). In addition, democratic institutions have an effect on 
whether the bureaucracy becomes insulated and autonomous. Furthermore, 
whether a bureaucracy is insulated or not and autonomous, has bearing on the 
functioning of CDPIs. 
 
2 Insulated and Autonomous Bureaucracy: this is the functioning of state 
bureaucracy, which is responsible for management of proceeds from mineral 
resources. It is operationalised through government effectiveness as defined by the 
WGI: that is a combination of quality of public services, capacity of the civil 
service and its independence from political pressures; and quality of policy. 
Accordingly, it has to do with professionalism and in particular the ability of the 
bureaucracy to resist political influence. This entails that decision-making powers 
are detached from ruling elites. In relation to the core of this study, resource rents 
are governed according to the law and directed towards development priorities and 
political elites do not influence the process. 
 
3 Centralised Development Planning Institutions: this will be operationalised 
as a hegemonic planning institution(s), which coordinates development related 
policy making across state sectors to allow synchronisation of policies. In addition, 
the institution (s) directly or indirectly oversees the rent process. As alluded to, 
CDPIs are part of the state bureaucracy but the justification for making it an 
independent variable is that arguably most bureaucracies are characterised 
inefficiencies and “pockets of efficiency”. In other words, not all parts of the 
bureaucracy are efficient but a CDPI is usually an efficient organ (a pocket of 
efficiency) in most developmental states. Since there are no indicators that measure 
the functioning of CDPIs, as they are part of the bureaucracy, I will rely on other 
scholars’ research and secondary data from journals, books and research papers.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Economic Outcomes: in this study the major component of economic outcomes 
is linked to absence of corruption, rent-seeking and patronage politics in the rent 																																																								
5 In the WGI Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) define governance as “traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised.  This includes the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them”.  	
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process. In addition it is linked to how resource rents a consumed, utilised and 
distributed. As such, it is related to economic outcomes such as provision of 
welfare enhancing public goods, investment, foreign reserves and economic 
performance. These economic outcomes can be proxies for evaluating resource 
governance within the cases. I will attempt to utilise a combination of indicators. I 
will use the Word Bank development indicators for general assessment of 
economic performance. Equally important, the study will rely on secondary data 
that has focused on how resource rents have been consumed, utilised and 
distributed. This will be linked specifically to verifiable outcomes such as provision 
of public goods, reserves and investments.  
 
Case Selection 
 
There are a number of potentially relevant cases for this study. Countries with 
resources such as diamonds, oil and gas or which are viewed as resource rich are 
potentially relevant for this study. For instance, countries with mineral 
endowments such as Angola, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, 
Sudan, South Sudan and Ivory Coast can potentially be part of the study. However, 
in the literature these countries lack institutions that have restraining capacity such 
as democratic institutions or CDPIs. In some cases CDPIs have become tools for 
the ruling elite to pursue political and economic interests. In short, there are no 
meaningful restraints in the political system. The crux of the research is to do an 
institutional analysis of institutions of restraint in countries that have been 
successful in managing their resource rents. Botswana and Namibia qualify as such. 
The two countries have successfully embarked on a resource rent driven economic 
growth and developmental process. Botswana has been the focus of many studies 
of resource led development and its trajectory is presented as a model for many 
SSA countries. Namibia has gradually followed a similar trend but the two 
countries have different resource governance architectures. Correspondingly, the 
two cases provide one with an opportunity to engage in a comparative analysis, 
teasing out the similarities and differences. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. BOTSWANA: DIAMONDS, DEMOCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
BACKGROUND  
 
Before attempting to explain resource governance in any country, it is necessary to 
understand the political system, the structure of the economy and the importance 
of resource rents. Having attained independence from the British in 1966, 
Botswana became one of the most stable democracies in SSA. Since independence 
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has dominated the political landscape. This 
has prompted some political commentators to refer to Botswana as a one party 
state through elections (Tsie 1996: 600, Jerven 2010: 64). What explains its 
dominance is elite formation after independence and the composition of the ruling 
elite. The ruling elite has largely been the economic elite, in particular cattle owners 
(Good 1994: 499). The formation of the BDP was a fusion of political and 
economic elites (Hillbom 2010: 209). Cattle owners were the economic elite, 
because ranching was the main economic activity that the colonial administration 
supported. In addition, ranching was the main driver of the economy before the 
discovery of diamonds. Furthermore, cattle owning was the main source of wealth 
and prestige. As a result, economic elites were at the forefront of political 
processes. 
 
The dominance of the BDP is explained by its alliance (or ruling coalition) that is 
composed of political elites, top civil servants, cattle owners, traditional leaders and 
the rural populace. The rural populace is to a larger extent dependent on cattle 
owners and chiefs (Tsie 1999: 604, Hjort 2010: 694, Poteete 2009: 557). The 
mutuality of interests within the alliance, and between the dominant and 
dominated classes, enabled Botswana to adopt a more democratic political system 
rather than a one party state (Samatar and Oldfield 1995: 668). Its leadership had 
broad legitimacy because the founding leader Seretse Khama was an heir to 
chieftainship (Hjort 2010: 694). Moreover, the interests of the different groups 
were going to be served by a strong state. As such, it allowed the BDP to construct 
a political party that had broad support, which in turn legitimised the new state. 
Nevertheless, most scholars single out the importance of cattle owners in the 
alliance. Cattle owners wanted an effective state that would ensure access to 
lucrative markets, such as the European market, for their beef (Eriksen 2011). The 
importance of cattle owners and their interest in policies is reflected in the 
composition of the national parliament. From the 42 members of parliament in the 
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first three parliaments, no less than 27 were large or medium cattle owners 
(Eriksen 2011: 11, Hillbom 2008: 208). This brief background provides an 
overview of the political system and the main actors. Most importantly, it 
demonstrates why the BDP has managed to win all elections since independence. 
The BDPs electoral victories had implications on democratic institutions and how 
the state functioned. 
 
At independence Botswana was one the poorest countries in world with a per 
capita income of about $ 70 (Word Bank 2016). The main economic activity was 
cattle ranching and beef exports were the main source of revenues. In addition, it 
also received some revenue as a member of the South Africa Customs Union 
(SACU). At independence Botswana did not have social and economic 
infrastructure: a few schools, clinics and other public services. This has changed 
over time due to the discovery of diamonds. Botswana started to capture a 
substantial amount of diamond rents in the 1970s when the government 
renegotiated the ownership structure with De Beers in 1969. The new agreement 
was based on equal partnership and as a result the government retained 50% of the 
profits compared to the 85%: 15% structure in favour of De Beers. By becoming 
an equal partner in the venture, the government boosted its revenue retention 
through higher taxes. The partnership led to the creation of Debswana, which 
dominates the diamond industry but does not have a legal monopoly. This 
ownership structure resembles state ownership without control but still places the 
state at the centre of the rent process.  
 
 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
One political party has dominated the democratic system in Botswana and this 
calls into question the robustness of its democratic institutions. As already 
established in the discussion thus far, new research lends support to the argument 
that democratic institutions are adequate in restraining the state and the ruling elite 
from engaging in corruption, rent seeking and patronage. The robustness of 
democratic institutions can be instrumentalised to assess the overall governance 
context of a country and this can be indirectly linked to resource governance. 
Noteworthy is that there is a debate on what is the reliable method of measuring or 
assessing governance. The debate revolves around whether governance should be 
understood by attributes (measured by process indicators) or also by its impact 
(measured by outcome indicators) (McFerson 2009a). Another issue to take into 
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account is the assumption that in a democratic system there is generally good 
governance, which leads to good policies and outcomes. This is mainly explained 
by the existence of rule of law, accountability and transparency. Yet, sometimes it 
is quite possible for bad policies or decisions to come out of transparent and 
accountable processes (and for good policies to emerge out of non-transparent and 
unaccountable processes). This argument provides us with an entry point into 
discussing the robustness of the democratic institutions in Botswana and their 
capacity to contribute to control of corruption, curbing rent-seeking and patronage 
politics.  
 
Rule of Law 
 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) define the rule of law as “the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”. This is a very comprehensive definition that 
captures the intricacies of rule of law in a country. The WGI has indicators from 
1996 to 2014; hence it is difficult to assess the robustness of rule of law since 
Botswana started receiving huge amount of resource rents in the 1970s. 
Consequently, the only option that is viable is to use secondary data to assess the 
period before 1996.  
 
In accounting for the economic performance in Botswana, most scholars generally 
agree that the country’s good economic policies and the economic performance 
reflect its institutions (Acemoglu 2003, Hjort 2010). Acemoglu et al (2003) call 
these institutions “institutions of private property”, and rule of law is part of these 
institutions. Acemoglu et al (2003) argue that since independence the ruling elite 
had an interest in strong institutions that would undergird its developmental 
efforts. The political culture since independence gave the ruling elite a strong 
incentive to invest in state capacity and rule of law had to accompany this capacity 
(Hjort 2010: 695). An injection of resource rents did not negatively affect the 
political system, which could have indirectly affected the rule of law. By the time 
resource rents started flowing, the ruling elite had already started building a 
relatively democratic system and efficient institutions (Acemoglu 2003: 105). 
Relatedly, the surge in resources could have reinforced a process that was already 
underway.  
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When institutions limit the powers of rulers, how they can exercise power and 
most importantly the range of distortionary policies that they can pursue, good 
policies are likely to be crafted and implemented (Acemoglu et al 2003: 103). The 
ruling elite realised that a limitation on how power was used would encourage 
investors such as De Beers to plant money into the development of diamond 
mining in the long-term. On one hand the dependence of the new state and the 
ruling elite for legitimacy on economic performance required rule of law that 
would ensure the flow of investment into the prospecting, development and 
extraction of diamonds. On the other hand, rule of law was essential to restraint 
various agents from engaging practices that would result in the plundering of 
resource rents when they start flowing. Regardless of the commitment to the rule 
of law a few cases of corruption and mismanagement emerged in the 1990s that 
involved some members of the ruling elite (Good 1994).  
 
Even though these scandals were made public, those that were involved were not 
made to account for their actions. The government only responded with the 
establishment of the Directorate of Economic Crime and Corruption (DECC). 
The DECC has the authority to report cases of corruption directly to the 
president. The establishment of such an institution demonstrated a commitment to 
rule of law and good governance. The constitution also makes the attorney general 
independent of the government and politicians. According to Limi (2006: 11) these 
two mechanisms have provided Botswana with a conducive environment for 
proper resource management. Given the interests of the ruling elite, it is plausible 
that rule of law has been relatively maintained since independence. Table6 1 and 
Figure 1 below shows that rule of law in Botswana has been improving generally 
since 1996 but the trend requires some assessment. In 1996 it scored 62.68 the 
lowest and in 2014 it scored 74.04 which is the highest thus far. The average score 
from 1996 to 2014 has been 68.33. The developers of the index suggest users to 
assess changes over long periods of time. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that rule 
law has been generally robust. 
 
 
 
																																																								
6 Tables sourced from the Kaufmaan and Kraay (2016) show country scores. Country scores 
range from a worst of –2.5 standard deviations from the worldwide mean of zero to a best of 
+2.5 standard deviations.  
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Table 1. Botswana, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
 
Figure 1. Botswana, 1996-2014. Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
 
Botswana, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law
Individual Indicators used to co str ct Rule of Law
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADB African Development Bank CPIA http://cpia.afdb.org/ .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.79
ASD Asian Development Bank CPIA http://www.adb.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.78
CCR Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
FRH Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.59 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.62 0.59
GII Global Integrity http://www.globalintegrity.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.50 0.46
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.61 0.63
HER Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom http://www.heritage.org 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
HUM CIRI Human Rights Database http://www.humanrightsdata.com 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 ..
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.63 .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.54 0.54 0.54
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments http://www.worldbank.org .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.58 0.58 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
TPR US State Department Trafficking in People report http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33
VAB Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer Survey http://www.lapopsurveys.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WJP World Justice Project http://www.worldjusticeproject.org.  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.68 0.68 0.67
WMO IHS Global Insight Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.63 0.69 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.83
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Indicator Country Year No 
Sources 
Governance 
Scores (-2.5 
to+2.5) 
Percentile 
Rank (0-
100) 
Standard 
Error 
Rule of law Botswana 1996 5 0.50 62.68 0.21 
  1998 7 0.58 68.42 0.21 
  2000 7 0.53 64.59 0.17 
  2002 10 0.50 64.59 0.17 
  2003 10 0.67 71.29 0.17 
  2004 11 0.64 69.86 0.16 
  2005 11 0.60 67.46 0.15 
  2006 13 0.58 67.46 0.14 
  2007 13 0.61 67.94 0.15 
  2008 14 0.66 70.19 0.14 
  2009 14 0.65 68.25 0.14 
  2010 14 0.67 68.72 0.14 
  2011 14 0.66 69.48 0.14 
  2012 14 0.65 70.14 0.14 
  2013 15 0.59 68.25 0.13 
  2014 14 0.63 74.04 0.14 
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Transparency and Accountability 
 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) combine transparency and accountability under voice 
and accountability. Voice and accountability captures “the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Kaufmann and 
Kraay 2016). This draws attention to whether elections are competitive, free and 
fair. Electoral competition renders political elites vulnerable to perceptions of the 
voters (Bueno de Mesquita 2001). Accordingly, to retain political power they have 
to abide by governance principles that are in the interests of the huge sections of 
society (Bueno de Mesquita 2001). This includes effective management of resource 
rents, provision of welfare enhancing public goods and good management of the 
economy. Ineffective use of resource rents in a political system that allows the 
public to scrutinise the government can be electoral suicide for incumbent political 
parties. For instance, rampant corruption and rent-seeking can undermine the 
prospects of retaining power. Therefore, elections are an important process for 
ruling elites as the electorate can punish them for bad governance (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2009).  
 
Voice and accountability as defined by Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) provides one 
to take into whether citizens have the space to scrutinise the government and its 
operations. This can ensure that the government and ruling elites are transparent 
and accountable in the management of resource rents. For instance, a free media 
can publicise corruption scandals, unsustainable policies or patronage practices. 
This is also made possible by the existence of freedom of speech. Overall, without 
monitoring by citizens and a process that allows citizens to select and replace those 
in power, resource rents tend to be dissipated. However, McFerson (2009b: 1531) 
cautions that in and of themselves, freedom of expression and civic participation 
are insufficient to produce genuine political representativeness. 
 
Since independence elections in Botswana have been deemed free and fair even 
though the BDP has won all the elections. Parsons (1993: 79) avers that since the 
1974 elections, electoral competition has increased and the BDP has lost some 
important seats. This section will attempt to assess this development. From 1969 
the main opposition party has been the Botswana National Front (BNF). 7 																																																								
7 Other political parties that have emerged include the Botswana Labour Party (BLP), Lesedi-La-
Botswana (Light of Botswana) and the Independence Freedom Party (IFP), Botswana Congress 
Party and UDC 
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According to Tsie (1996: 608), in 1969 the BNF, which was not popular in most 
regions (especially the Southern Districts) and managed to win 3 seats (Kanye 
North, Kanye South and Ngwaketse west). The victory came barely four years 
after the BNF was established. During the 1974 elections the BNF lost Ngwaketse 
west to the BDP but continued to retain Kanye North and South, until it lost the 
seats in 1984 to the BDP (Parson 1993: 77). In 1989 elections the BNF continued 
its trend of capturing the votes of those disgruntled with the performance of the 
BDP. It managed to capture 27% of the total votes and only 3 seats (Parson 1993: 
65). However, in 1994 the BNF increased its clout by winning Gaborone North, 
Gaborone South and Okavango constituencies. By 1994 the BNF had become 
even much more stronger. It fielded 39 parliamentary candidates and won 13 seats 
out of 40. The 1994 elections enabled the BNF to increase its vote share from 29% 
in 1989 to 37% in 1994. These elections, according to Tsie (1996: 609) ended the 
dominance of the BDP and the BDP was shaken.  
 
The BNF split in 1998 and this led to the formation of the Botswana Congress 
Party (BCP) (BCP 2016). The BCP has relatively managed to attract supporters 
since its formation. In its first election in 1999 it managed to garner 11 % of the 
popular vote and one seat (BCP 2016). The 2004 elections saw the BCP increasing 
its popular vote to 16% but only managed one seat (BCP 2016). However, after 
2004 it had representation in 8 districts or town councils (BCP 2016). Elections in 
2009 saw the BCP close in on the BNF as it increased its seats to 4, while the BNF 
won 6 seats (Eisa 2009). In 2012 a landmark development took place as the 
Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) was formed (The Patriot on Sunday 
2015). The UDC is an alliance between the BNF, Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) 
and Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD). UDC’s formation has prompted 
political pundits to argue that it might take power from the BDP by 2019 (The 
Patriot on Sunday 2015). This could be possible considering its performance 
during the 2014 elections that were argued to be very competitive. The BDP won 
37 seats, the UDC trailed with 17 seats and the BCP won 3 seats (EISA 2014). 
This is the first time that the BDP has won elections without a 50% or more of the 
vote share. According to EISA (2014) the voter turn out in the 2014 elections was 
about 84.75%, which shows that people do participate in elections. The turn out 
has increased over the years, from 21% in 1974 to 37% in 1979, and then to more 
than 50% in elections held in the 1980s (Holm 1993: 92). The results of 2014 are 
indicative of an increase in electoral competition and that the era of one dominant 
party could be ending. More importantly, is that the citizens are free to chose the 
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government nationally and locally. Figure 2 below shows the vote share of 
different political parties between 1965 and 2004.  
 
Figure 2. Votes shares in parliamentary elections, 1965-2004 
 
 
 
Source: Poteete (2009)  
 
Elections are once off events that can be misleading as evidence for the 
participation of the masses in politics. Elections are just one strand of participation 
in politics. A closer reading requires one to take into account continuous 
participation of the masses in socio-political issues. Constant participation of the 
masses is essential as this is the route through which check and balances are 
provided in a political system (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). In other words, the 
participation of the masses is how ruling elites are made accountable and 
transparent in how they govern. This is fundamental in resource rich countries 
where corruption, rent-seeking and patronage are inevitable if there are no avenues 
for providing checks and balances. Writing in the 1990s Good (1994: 518) argues 
the masses in Botswana participate as voters once every five years and not usually 
otherwise.8 In addition, the masses were to a larger extent dis-engaged from 
political processes and did not make demands from ruling elite (Good 1994: 518). 
Furthermore, this incapacity to make demands extended to the institutions tasked 
with making demands from the government (Good 1994: 518). Holm (1993: 92) 
echoes similar sentiments that the increase of voters in Botswana is not reflective 
of the emergence of a participant stratum that is engaged in daily political 
processes and that makes demands from the elected officials.  
 
Table 2 and Figure 3 below show Botswana’s performance on Voice and 
Accountability since 1996. Generally the results suggest that there has been a 																																																								8	See Good (1992) on a discussion about how Botswana is an elite democracy.  
persistent electoral coalition that gave the BDP firm control over the government,
at least during the 1980s. The stability of the BDP’s coalition fostered a long-
term perspective. BDP politicians adopted policies and created institutions that
favoured long-term development with confidence they would be arou d to enjoy the
benefits.
Coalitions and Cha ge
Any ex lanatio of macroeconomic policies in Botswana must account for both
Botswana’s long period of success and its more ambiguous performance in recent
years. I point to changes in political coalitions as the drivers of changes in policy and
political development more generally. At independence, the BDP constructed a
broad coalition by: (1) protecting the interests of both livestock exporters and
importers of stable foods; (2) defusing ethno-regional political comp tition; and (3)
depicting the opposition as a threat to national security. As discussed below,
socioeconomic changes have eroded the political weight of the BDP’s rural base.
International threats subsided with the end f apartheid and decreased the perceived
risk of voting for the opposition.15 The opposition initially found support in rapidly
growing urban areas but has gained increasing tr ction in rural areas with appeals to
ethnic minorities and promises of greater local self-determination (Solway, 2002;
Werbner, 2004). As a result, the BDP found itself increasingly associated with and
dependent upon voters in Central district, and has been forced to look for new
sources of electoral support. The narrowing of the BDP’s political coalition and the
dynamics of increased political competition since the 1990s created new opportu-
nities for policy change and help account for Botswana’s more ambiguous
macroeconomic performance.
Botswana has experienced rapid urbanisation and, as discussed ab ve, a dramatic
decline in the significance of agriculture. The transformation into an urban society is
dramatic. The vast majority of Batswana (82%) lived in rural areas as recently as
Figure 5. Votes shares in parliamentary elections, 1965–2004. Sources: Holm and Darnolf,
2000; Republic of Botswana, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1999, 2004.
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decrease in this governance dimension over the years. Consequently, the results are 
analogous to the argument made by Holm (1993) that an increase in voter turn out 
does not necessarily translate to mass participation of the citizens. It is also worth 
noting that Botswana has enjoyed democratic rule in the sense of a multiparty 
system with regular elections. However, the ultimate test for a democracy is 
whether or not the dominant party will peacefully relinquish power if it loses an 
election. As elections are becoming more competitive, a defeat for the BDP will be 
a crucial moment for Botswana’s democracy.  
 
Table 2.  Botswana, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Voice and Accountability 
 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator Country Year No 
Sources 
Governance 
Scores (-2.5 
to+2.5) 
Percentile 
Rank (0-100) 
Standard 
Error 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Botswana 1996 5 0.87 74.52 0.22 
  1998 5 0.73 70.19 0.23 
  2000 6 0.64 66.83 0.21 
  2002 9 0.65 67.79 0.17 
  2003 10 0.69 68.27 0.16 
  2004 11 0.73 72.60 0.16 
  2005 13 0.57 65.87 0.15 
  2006 15 0.49 61.54 0.13 
  2007 15 0.48 61.06 0.13 
  2008 15 0.48 61.54 0.13 
  2009 15 0.42 59.24 0.13 
  2010 15 0.44 61.14 0.13 
  2011 15 0.40 59.62 0.13 
  2012 15 0.50 64.45 0.12 
  2013 16 0.47 62.56 0.11 
  2014 13 0.44 61.58 0.12 
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Figure 3. Botswana, 1996-2014: Aggregate Indicator: Voice and Accountability 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
 
 
INSULATED AND AUTONOMOUS BUREAUCRACY 
 
Developmental states are generally argued to have an insulated and autonomous 
bureaucracy. The effectiveness and efficiency of the bureaucracy determine the 
implementation of policies. In addition, the efficiency of the bureaucracy is also 
depended on whether it succumbs to political pressure, either from politicians or 
the society at large. Succumbing to political pressure can result in ineffective and 
inefficient functioning of the bureaucracy that can breed corruption, patronage and 
rent-seeking. In SSA after independence most ruling parties rushed to localise the 
bureaucracy and this led to dismal government performance. The localisation of 
the bureaucracy was also part and parcel of rewarding key political clients and 
supporters. Therefore, it made the bureaucracy prone to political interference. The 
BDP did not rush to localise the bureaucracy because it did not have educated 
people as replacements (Taylor 2005: 51). Instead, it retained most of the colonial 
bureaucrats while gradually training locals. To guide the following section, two 
interrelated questions are worth posing: is there tension between the operational 
logic of a democracy (democratic institutions) and that of an insulated and 
autonomous bureaucracy? Stated differently, is it possible to have an autonomous 
and insulated bureaucracy within a democratic system?  
 
Botswana, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Voice & Accountabillity
Individual Indicators used to construct Voice & Accountability
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.67
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. 0.92 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81
CCR Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.67
FRH Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.52
GII Global Integrity http://www.globalintegrity.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.48 0.47
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.82 0.82 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.77 0.65 0.67 0.65
HUM CIRI Human Rights Database http://www.humanrightsdata.com 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.81 0.69 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 ..
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.68 .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83
IRP IREEP African Electoral Index http://www.ireep.org .. .. 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MSI IREX Media Sustainability Index http://www.irex.org .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.51 0.51 0.51 ..
OBI International Budget Project Open Budget Index http://www.internationalbudget.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 0.92 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
RSF Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index http://www.rsf.org .. .. .. .. 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.86 0.87 0.83 0.86 0.78 0.78 0.77
VAB Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer Survey http://www.lapopsurveys.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WJP World Justice Project http://www.worldjusticeproject.org.  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.67 0.62 0.59
WMO IHS Global Insight Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 ..
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The economic success of Botswana and as in other developmental states has been 
attributed to the insulated and autonomous bureaucracy, which to a larger extent is 
credited as efficient and effective in policy implementation. Taylor (2005: 46) 
argues that Botswana’s success, as a developmental state is located in its 
professional bureaucracy that has implemented policies effectively and efficiently. 
Theoretically the role of the bureaucracy in policymaking is straightforward. The 
bureaucracy is supposed to provide information and expertise for the politicians to 
utilise in the process of policymaking. In addition, its principal role is to implement 
policies that have been formulated by elected representatives. However, a closer 
look at the role of the bureaucracy is Botswana evince a different picture augments 
the argument that this study seeks to advance.  
 
Before discussing the nature of the bureaucracy in Botswana, it is essential to 
establish how it became autonomous and insulated. At independence the civil 
service was the only state organ that possessed the skills and expertise in policy 
making. Due to the weakness of other state institutions, there was a vacuum that 
allowed the bureaucracy to grow and become dominant in Botswana’s political 
economy (Somolekae 1993: 119). The major principles that the new state inherited 
were civil service autonomy, neutrality and long-term career tenure. From the 
literature on developmental states clear that such attributes contributed to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of a bureaucracy. With the discovery of diamonds that 
became the main source of revenues and capital for investment, the bureaucracy 
became an important organ in the management of the diamond rents.  
 
A sudden injection of resource rents into the economy required careful policy 
implementation that would inhibit wastage by pursuing unviable developmental 
projects and investments. To perform such a task, the bureaucracy went through 
an expansion in scope and complexity. The expansion was prompted by the 
realisation that planning on its own was inadequate and it had to be complemented 
by proper implementation (Sebububudu 2005: 81). This positioned the 
bureaucracy that was staffed with expatrites as a dominant player in policymaking 
and implementation. Gunderson (quoted in Danevad 1993: 104) argued that the 
BDP ruled but policymaking was directed by the expatrites who controlled the 
bureaucracy. Arguably, the politicians were subjected to bureaucrats. This echoes 
similar observations made in relation to Asian developmental states where the 
politicians reign and bureaucrats rule. Hence, from independence the bureaucracy 
was very influential in policy making and implementation. It is important to 
highlight that the observations concerning the relationships between politicians 
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and bureaucrats were valid in the 1970s. Yet, it is reasonable to expect this pattern 
to have been maintained over the years.  
 
Due to the dominance of the bureaucracy in policymaking it is safe to suggest that 
it has been insulated from societal pressure and autonomous from ruling elites. 
According to Taylor (2005: 51) Botswana maintained a strong, autonomous and 
effective bureaucracy by ensuring the planning bureaucrats are insulated from 
societal pressure, employing expatrites and by training locals. In addition, the 
expatrites were detached from society and this culture became embedded in the 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the efficiency of the bureaucracy was enhanced by the 
recruitment strategy. Entrance into the bureaucracy and promotion was based on 
qualifications and merit (Sebudubudu 2005: 82, Good 1992: 88). Considerable 
attention was accorded to placing well-qualified people in key positions and 
retaining them for extended periods (Good 1992: 74). This is in line with the 
recruitment strategies in other developmental states. Interconnected to this was the 
creation of policy analysis capabilities that was driven by the planning staff 
involved in budgetary and economic planning (Sebudubudu 2005: 84). These 
mechanisms allowed the government to build capacity within key ministries and 
line ministries (Sebudubudu 2005: 84). Subsequently, it led to the creation of a 
bureaucracy that was competent, efficient and largely non-corrupt. Since 
independence a bureaucratic apparatus that was effective and efficient was 
recognised as vital for state led development (Eriksen 2011). In sum, most scholars 
agree that the bureaucracy, in Botswana since independence, has been effective in 
most aspects and government performance has been impressive.  
 
 
CENTRALISED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING INSTITUTIONS 
 
Developmental states have CDPIs or “pilot agencies” that direct and plan 
economic affairs. The CDPIs are effective in their mandate and in most 
developmental they are the core of the bureaucracy. As Leftwich (1995: 411-412) 
puts it, economic coordination in developmental states has been driven by specific 
institutions whose main objective is to ensure constant interaction between the 
state and the economy. Several scholars emphasise the core-position of the 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) in the Botswana’s 
bureaucracy. Samatar (1999:85) described the MFDP, established in 1970, as the 
institutional brain of economic policy-making and dominated all other ministries. 
It is this dominance, effectiveness and its coordination role that I want to argue 
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gave the MFDP a restraining capacity. Given that when Botswana discovered 
diamonds democratic institutions were not yet institutionalised (and state 
institutions were new and fragile) it provided space for a CDPI to provide the 
restrains that were necessary in the management of resource rents.  
 
Some scholars assert that to understand the success in resource management in 
Botswana we have to look at the process of political coalition building not 
necessary state development. One of these scholars is Poteete (2009: 546) who 
argues that the success in managing resource rents in Botswana cannot be 
attributed to the extent of past state development without stretching the concept 
beyond recognition. Accordingly, Poteete (2009) proposes that the political 
coalition of the BDP explains its success before the institutionalisation of state 
institutions and democracy. Contrary to Poteete’s (2009) proposition, I want to 
suggest that the bureaucracy and in particular the MFDP was well equipped and 
staffed with expatrites and former colonial administrators that were competent 
enough to ensure good management of resource rents before the 
institutionalisation of the state and democracy.  
 
The dominance that was made possible by the vacuum that existed at 
independence allowed the MFDP to become the epicentre of economic planning. 
It is crucial to provide a few arguments that illustrate that the MFDP had (and still 
has) a dominant position in Botswana’s political economy. According to the 
National Development Plan (NDP) II of 1970-1975 the MFDP is the institution 
that plans, coordinates, monitors and ensures that economic projects that are being 
implemented are not only in line with the NDP but are budgeted for (Republic of 
Botswana 1970 cited in Danevad 1993). In addition, the MFDP does not only 
oversea the implementation of projects but provides economic advice to the 
government and other ministries (Republic of Botswana 1970 cited in Danevad 
1993). In line with this, Colclough and McCarthy (1980:91) observed that other 
ministries could exercise little initiative without the MFDPs approval. Danevad 
(1993: 68) adds that the present strength of the MFDP is not only reflected in the 
organisational set-up; the fact that Quett Masire after independence both headed 
the MFDP and served as Vice President, has enabled the MFDP to develop as a 
stronghold in the bureaucracy. These observations by different scholars testify the 
dominance of the MFDP in Botswana’s political economy. The question that 
needs to be asked is how does this dominance impact the functioning of 
democratic institutions? Or is possible to have such a CDPI without it 
undermining democratic institutions? 
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Without underestimating the role of the bureaucracy and in particular the role of 
MFDP in Botswana’s development, the overall picture suggests that it has had 
implications on democracy in general. The discussion on insulated and an 
autonomous bureaucracy has established that the bureaucracy dominated policy-
making. The dominance of the MFDP and other agencies within the bureaucracy 
runs contrary to democratic principle of having elected representatives formulate 
policy. The relationship between the bureaucracy and the elected representatives is 
theoretically straightforward. Elected representatives formulate policy and the 
bureaucracy implements it. Yet, the empirical observation in many countries, 
including Botswana, shows this is not the case.  
 
On the one hand, the separation between bureaucrats and politicians allows 
bureaucrats to make political decisions without having to be held politically 
accountable for their actions. On the other hand the separation also benefits 
politicians by allowing politically sensitive decisions to be made by individuals who 
do not have to face the electorate. Moreover, this separation does allow decisions 
to be made without interference from the masses that can demand changes to 
policies if they affect them or do not benefit them. What this suggests is a 
contradiction between democracy and an insulated and autonomous bureaucracy. 
Acknowledging this contradiction, I want to suggest that the autonomy of a CDPI 
is a mechanism through which it becomes an institution of restraint. In other 
words it allows a CDPI to provide check and balances when and if democratic 
institutions are sidelined due the dominance of the bureaucracy.  
 
CDPIs as bureaucracies tend to be based on different operational logics compared 
to democracy and its institutions. Democracy and its attendant institutions are 
based on representation, transparency and accountability; while CDPIs emphasise 
economic efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, CDPIs are based on rules and 
regulations, rationality and expertise. The mere fact that they are centralised 
suggests that those who are deemed qualified to make decisions guide decisions 
made by CDPIs. Therefore, the tension between democracy and CDPIs is 
inevitable. According to Somolekae (1993: 115) problems arise when the 
bureaucracy (read CDPI) becomes too powerful, dominate decision-making and 
has the capacity to exempt itself from democratic accountability.  
 
Several scholars have illustrated that this was and is the case in Botswana since 
independence (Somolekae 1993, Tsie 1996, Samatar 1999, Holm 1996). Holm 
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(1996: 97) argues that lack of democratic accountability over the state bureaucracy, 
including the MFDP, has been a central feature in Botswana’s development. 
Without being subjected to democratic accountability, the bureaucracy and mainly 
the MFDP sidelined democratic institutions in resource rent management. This is 
not to suggest that democratic institutions were or are not essential. The argument 
that this study seeks to advance is that the lows levels of corruption, rent-seeking, 
and patronage; and the economic outcomes that Botswana has managed to register 
over the years can only be adequately explained by taking into account the central 
role played by MFDP. In other words, the MFDP provided restrains that explain 
Botswana as a success story. This is the key to reconceptualising institutions of 
restraint by taking into account the possibility of an interaction between 
democratic institutions and CDPIs. The next section will focus on economic 
outcomes that illustrate the importance of institutions of restraint in the 
management of resource rents.  
 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) define government effectiveness as “the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies”. The analysis 
above suggests that since independence the government has been effective in 
discharging its duties, particularly policy implementation. Table 3 and Figure 4 
below show government effectiveness from 1996 to 2014 according to WGI.  
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Table 3.  Botswana, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
 
Figure 4. Botswana, 1996-2014: Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
Botswana, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness
Individual Indicators used to construct Government Effectiveness
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADB African Development Bank CPIA http://cpia.afdb.org/ .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.72
ASD Asian Development Bank CPIA http://www.adb.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.44
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.49
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.29
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments http://www.worldbank.org .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WMO IHS Global Insight Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.69 0.78
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Percentile 
Rank (0-100) 
Standard 
Error 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Botswana 1996 3 0.47 68.29 0.22 
  1998 5 0.50 71.22 0.25 
  2000 5 0.51 70.73 0.20 
  2002 8 0.59 73.17 0.21 
  2003 8 0.73 74.63 0.17 
  2004 9 0.64 73.17 0.17 
  2005 9 0.66 72.20 0.17 
  2006 11 0.52 69.76 0.17 
  2007 11 0.59 72.82 0.18 
  2008 11 0.56 70.39 0.18 
  2009 11 0.48 67.94 0.18 
  2010 11 0.46 67.46 0.18 
  2011 11 0.48 67.77 0.18 
  2012 10 0.45 66.99 0.19 
  2013 11 0.37 65.55 0.18 
  2014 11 0.32 64.90 0.19 
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An assessment of government effectiveness over a long period, it is safe to 
conclude that government effectiveness, in the period covered by the indicators, 
has been declining. Yet, comparing it with other SSA countries Botswana has been 
performing much better. Institutional coherence has been an important factor for 
government efficiency and capacity to insulate itself from societal pressures 
(Danevad 1993: 67). Respectively, one can safely conclude that overall, 
government effectiveness in Botswana has been maintained over the years. Having 
discussed the overall performance of the bureaucracy, the study moves in the core 
area of the argument: that CDPIs can be part and parcel of a restraining 
framework. The following section will rely mainly of the qualitative assessment that 
other scholars have made. It will also make an assessment of the role of the MFDP 
as a CDPI and its capacity to restrain the state and other agents in the economy.  
 
 
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
The previous discussion laid out the important role the MFDP played in 
Botswana’s political economy. It illustrated ways in which as CDPIs, the MFDP 
had room to provide restraints. To reiterate, the dominance of the MFDP in policy 
making, its autonomy from political intrusion and arguably its exemption from 
democratic accountability allowed it to play a restraining role in conjunction with 
economic planning. I want to illustrate some of the ways in which the MFDP 
provided restraints, particularly in relation to utilisation and distribution of 
resource rents. Collier and Hoeffler (2009) provide us with a good starting in 
understanding how CDPIs can provide restraints. Collier and Hoeffler (2009: 305) 
argue that what is required in resource rich countries is a democracy that has 
strong checks and balances relative to electoral competition. From their argument 
one can surmise that electoral competition is not adequate in providing restrains. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2009) add that the checks and balances are a public good that 
can only be provided by citizens only when they are prompted to do so through 
taxation. However, in relation to Botswana, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) suggest 
that the reason why checks and balances have been maintained is a combination of 
factors that include uninterrupted democracy since independence and the legal 
(read rule of law) and bureaucratic procedures.  
 
The most important institutional aspects in resource rich countries are control of 
corruption, rule of law, the competence of the state and particularly the 
bureaucracy (Brunnschweiler 2008, Limi 2006). These aspects are interconnected. 
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Low levels of corruption in an economy is indicative of how well the economy is 
managed. Hence, institutional quality is often controlled by using a measure of 
corruption (Brunnschweiler 2008: 403-404). Corruption enfeebles institutions such 
as the rule of law and this in turn weakens CDPIs. This study seeks to extend the 
proposition that bureaucratic procedures have provided restraints in the 
management of resource rents in Botswana. In fact bureaucratic procedures have 
been more decisive in providing restraints. This is apparent when one considers 
the role played by the MFDP in relation to the spending of resources rents, 
curbing corruption, rent-seeking and patronage politics. Moreover, if one consider 
that there has been a modicum of elite capture in Botswana it becomes apparent 
that MFDP as a CDPI with competence and professionalism has been the main 
pillar of restraining the state from pursuing unsustainable policies or policies 
motivated by patronage concerns.  
 
Control of Corruption, Rent-Seeking and Patronage 
 
From the literature and research on Botswana, what emerges is that corruption has 
been under control. Corruption is not systematic within the economy and it is not 
an epidemic as compared to other resource rich countries in SSA (Tsie 1996, 
McFerson 2009a, Auty 2001, Acemoglu 2003, Good 1994). Good (1994) 
characterised corruption in Botswana as an elite phenomenon that is present in 
certain spheres of the economy.9 In addition, rent-seeking and patronage have 
been kept checked, although a few cases of rent-seeking involving the elite 
emerged in the 1990s. Let us look a control of corruption first. Kaufmann and 
Kraay (2016) define control of corruption as “the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”. Table 4 and Figure 5 
below show how Botswana performs in the WGI on control of corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
9 For a discussion on corrupt activities among the elite in Botswana see Good (1994) 
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Table 4.  Botswana, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
  
Figure 5. Botswana, 1996-2014: Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
Botswana, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption
Individual Indicators used to construct Control of Corruption
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADB African Development Bank CPIA http://cpia.afdb.org/ .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.80
ASD Asian Development Bank CPIA http://www.adb.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. .. 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.70
CCR Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
FRH Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GCB Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Survey http://www.transparency.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.57
GII Global Integrity http://www.globalintegrity.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.40 0.30
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.30
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.62 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.70 .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.42 0.42 0.42
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments http://www.worldbank.org .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
PRC Political Economic Risk Consultancy Corruption in Asia http://www.asiarisk.com/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.67
VAB Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer Survey http://www.lapopsurveys.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WJP World Justice Project http://www.worldjusticeproject.org.  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.75 0.73 0.65
WMO IHS Global Insight Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.66 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.67
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Control of 
Corruption 
Botswana 1996 3 0.59 74.63 0.30 
  1998 5 0.71 77.56 0.20 
  2000 5 0.67 75.12 0.24 
  2002 7 0.61 74.63 0.18 
  2003 8 1.25 85.85 0.19 
  2004 9 0.88 80.00 0.17 
  2005 9 1.14 83.41 0.18 
  2006 11 0.90 78.05 0.15 
  2007 11 0.94 79.13 0.16 
  2008 11 0.99 80.10 0.15 
  2009 11 0.92 78.95 0.16 
  2010 11 1.00 80.48 0.16 
  2011 11 0.98 80.09 0.16 
  2012 11 0.92 78.47 0.15 
  2013 12 0.91 78.95 0.15 
  2014 12 0.80 75.96 0.14 
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Table 4 and Figure 5 above demonstrate that corruption has been largely 
controlled in Botswana. Even though the indicators cover 1996 to 2014, the results 
allows one to conclude that corruption has been largely under control since 
resource rents started to flow into the economy. What does not come out explicitly 
in literature on Botswana’s ability to control corruption is the role of the MFDP. 
The literature attributes low levels of corruption in Botswana to the democratic 
system and role of its leaders. As a result one does not find any contribution of the 
bureaucratic procedures, within the MFDP, as providing restraints. To illustrate 
this let us look at a few examples of bureaucratic procedures that allowed the 
MFDP to play a critical role in restraining corruption.  
 
National Development Plans (NDPs) have determined government spending since 
1968. Until 1979 they covered 5 years but after 1979 have been covering 6 years. In 
essence, NDPs are an outline on how the government plans to spend public funds 
of which resource rents are huge a portion. For a project to be included in the 
NDP the MFDP has to evaluate it and sets the spending limits (Pegg 2010: 16). 
The MFDP evaluates all projects in terms of their economic viability to prevent 
unviable projects from getting funded. This system has largely been driven by 
technical expertise and not political considerations (Pegg 2010: 16). This system of 
financial controls limits executive discretion and the prospects for ad-hoc financing 
outside of the NDP. In line with this, a Development Fund was established, which 
can only spend money on projects approved in the NDP.   
 
Limits on executive discretion over spending of public resources are very essential 
in resource rich countries for restraining corruption. Executive discretion over 
spending of public resources can breed corruption or create opportunities for 
corruption to take place. Even in non-democratic developmental states, a limit on 
executive discretion assisted in curbing corruption. According to Jensen and 
Wantchekon (2004) executive discretion over the distribution of resource can lead 
to break down in democratic institutions such as transparency and accountability. 
In line with Jensen and Wantchekon’s (2004) proposition, one can argue that in 
some cases democratic institutions can be inadequate in restraining executive 
discretion over spending of resource rents. For that reason, it is plausible that the 
MFDP played a significant role in restraining executive discretion over the 
allocation of resources. Supervising other line ministries and synchronising 
policies, the MFDP ensured that patron-client relationships did not develop and in 
turn it circumvented corruption (Danevad 1993: 129). The power formally vested 
in the MFDP concerning the use of public funds can be viewed as a restraining 
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mechanism that contributed to budgetary discipline and coherence. Accordingly, it 
is safe to conclude that to a larger extent the MFDP played and plays a central role 
in providing the necessary restraints on how resource rents spent while being in 
line with NDPs.  
 
It is argued that resource rich countries may experience perverse institutional 
development because the availability of resource rents may create incentives for 
unproductive activities such as rent-seeking behavior (or extreme corruption and 
mismanagement) (Auty 2001, Isham et al 2005, Leite and Weidmann 1999). In 
such a case are democratic institutions adequate and effective in curbing these 
activities? Practices such as rent-seeking and provision of patronage have a political 
dimension that perhaps requires more than just accountability and transparency to 
be restrained. In some cases rent-seeking and patronage are legitimised by policies. 
Policies are crafted and implemented to facilitate the distribution rents as 
patronage to certain constituencies. Inappropriate policies can also be influenced 
by the effort of rent-seekers that are both within and outside of the public sector. 
Within the state, rent-seekers attempt to influence policymaking in ways that will 
benefit them. Thus, democratic institutions might be inadequate in providing 
restraints as they can be circumvented.  
Patron-client relations that typically penetrate state institutions in SSA, and thus 
frustrate effective policy-making and implementation, was not a major problem in 
Botswana (Danevad 1993:70). These patron-client relations are likely to develop in 
cases where there are numerous state owned companies (SOCs). In resource rich 
countries increase in public spending is often done through transfers to parastatals 
or expanding the civil service (Chapter Five will illustrate this). In Botswana the 
dominance of the MFDP hindered uncontrolled increase in public spending by 
limiting the proliferation of parastatals (Danevad 1993). The MFDP has been at 
forefront of ensuring that parastatals did not proliferate or become a burden on 
the economy (Danevad 1993). Restricting the proliferation of parastatals hindered 
the flow of resources into the public sector that is often prone to rent-seeking and 
corruption. Again, the MFDP was the main institution that provided restrains.  
Economic Performance 
 
The mining sector has always been an important engine of growth in Botswana 
(see Table 5).  From the 1970s when the government started receiving more rents 
from diamonds up to about the 1990s the economy has grown with double digits 
and from the 1990s up to now the economy has been growing at an average of 5%. 
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Figure 6 and 7 below show this trend. This growth has been driven by the mining 
sector, particularly the diamond industry. Table 5 below shows the distribution of 
GDP between mining and non-mining sectors from 1992 to 2009. The non-
mining sector is inclusive of all other sectors within the economy. It is clear that 
the mining sector has been the dominant sector in the economy. The contribution 
of mining to GDP has been between 35% and 41% for the period covered. This 
suggests that Botswana’s economy remains largely undiversified (see discussion 
below) 
 
Table 5: Share of Mining and Non-Mining sectors to GDP (1992-2009) 
 
 
 
Source: Malema (2012): Author calculated data from Bank of Botswana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Mining (%) Non-Mining (%) 
1992 37.0 63.0 
1993 35.5 64.5 
1994 35.8 64.2 
1995 34.2 65.8 
1996 33.9 66.1 
1997 66.1 66.1 
1998 34.4 65.6 
1999 32.1 67.9 
2000 33.3 66.7 
2001 36.5 63.5 
2002 42.0 58.0 
2003 42.2 57.8 
2004 40.5 59.5 
2005 40.7 59.3 
2006 41.7 58.3 
2007 39.0 61.0 
2008 36.5 63.5 
2009 28.3 71.7 
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Figure 6: Botswana Annual GDP growth rate (1970–2000) 
 
 
Figure 7: Botswana Annual GDP growth rate (2001–2015) 
 
 
A discussion on economic performance has to be linked to the structure of the 
economy. Resource rich countries tend to be dependent of the mineral sector and 
efforts are not made to ensure diversification of the economy. The growth that 
Botswana has experienced for over 50 years has made a few linkages with other 
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spheres of the economy. The argument advanced here is that although Botswana 
has grown rapidly and invested its mineral revenues wisely in education, health, 
roads and basic infrastructure, the country’s economy remains largely 
undiversified. For instance, regardless of the relatively constant flow of resource 
rents, Botswana has not managed to establish a vibrant manufacturing industry 
that creates employment opportunities or generates substantial revenues (see Table 
6).  
Table 6. Botswana GDP by sector (percentage of GDP at Current prices) 
 
            	
        	
Source: Honde and Abraha (2015): African Economic Outlook.10 
 
Table 5 and 6 above show that Botswana’s economy has not been diversified. For 
an economy that has been growing at an average of 8% per year it is safe to 
conclude that it is experiencing a resource or staple trap. According to the World 
Bank (2016) over the past 20 years Botswana has made some progress in reducing 
its dependence on diamonds, but it has not reached the level of economic 
diversification that can offset the diminishing mineral revenues. The manufacturing 
sector was earmarked as the key sector through which the twin goals of economic 
diversification and employment creation could be achieved (Stepanyan and 
Parulian 2013: 29). As a result the manufacturing sector has received preferential 
treatment both in terms of targeted policies and financial support, but the sector 																																																								10	Authors sourced the data from domestic authorities.	
 2009 2013 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting 3.3 2.6 
of which fishing .. .. 
Minining and Quarrying 15.9 24.5 
of which oil .. .. 
Manufacturing 7.4 5.7 
Electricity, gas and water 0.5 -0.2 
Construction 7.1 6.9 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of vehicles household goods, 
restaurants and hotels 
17.6 16.3 
Transport, storage and communication 6.3 6.0 
Finance, real estate and business services 15.3 15.2 
Public administrations and defence 19.4 16.3 
Other services 7.2 6.6 
Gross domestic product at bascic prices/factor cost 100.0 100.0 
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has consistently failed to produce the intended outcomes. 
A number of schemes have been initiated to encourage the diversification of the 
economy but they have largely failed to produce the intended outcomes (Stepanyan 
and Parulian 2013: 24). Some of these schemes have been abused and subsequently 
failed (Hillbom 2008). For instance the National Development Bank (NDB) was 
established as a vehicle for channeling loans from government. However, it has 
been reported that cabinet ministers and other parliamentarians had repeatedly 
sought loans that they did not qualify for (Good 1994: 511). In addition, some of 
these loans had been approved through political influence (Good 1994: 512). 
Furthermore, the elite abused the Small Borrowers Fund (SBF) that was meant for 
the poor (Good 1994: 512). As a result both the NDB and SBF were exploited 
extensively and did not produce the intended results. Unfortunately this remains a 
challenge that needs to be addressed in the long-term.  
Due to dependency on the mining sector the economy has failed to generate 
employment. Currently unemployment rate is about 17.8%, reaching 34% among 
youth (20- 24 years of age), reflecting the mismatch between the quality of 
education and labour market demand (Honde and Abraha 2015: 12). According to 
the World Bank (2016) Botswana is now an upper middle-income country and 
with a per capita income of about $6500. Poverty has declined from about 50% at 
independence to about 19% (World Bank 2016). However, it still faces pockets of 
extreme rural poverty and high-income disparities. Comparatively, within SSA, 
Botswana has made remarkable progress in its attempt to eradicate poverty.  
 
According to most recent information, the proportion of the population living 
below the poverty line declined from 30.6% in 2002/03 to 19.3% in 2009/10, 
while the share of the population in extreme poverty fell even more sharply from 
23.4% to 6.5% (Honde and Abraha 2015: 12). Despite the decline in poverty, 
inequality and exclusion are still serious issues in Botswana, whose Gini coefficient 
is about 0.61 (Honde and Abraha 2015: 12). Very high inequalities persisting over a 
long period of time are indicative of a failure to share wealth broadly and this 
unfortunately applies to Botswana. Therefore, it is essential for Botswana to come 
up with mechanisms for both wealth creation and sharing. Wealth creation can be 
initiated through diversifying the economy. Diversifying the economy can result in 
the creation of sustainable jobs and opportunities for entrepreneurship. These are 
some of the issues that the government has to address in the long-term while it still 
has access to resource rents.  
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Provision of Public Goods: Education and Health 
 
The discussion above established that the flow of resource rents into Botswana’s 
economy resulted in exceptional economic growth and resources have been 
available for provision of public goods. Resource rents are advantageous to an 
economy if the government has a long-term plan in extracting resources and an 
effective mechanism for spending the rents (Limi 2006: 4). Effective and efficient 
spending of resources rents should ensure that resource wealth is not 
overexploited and rapidly exhausted. Spending can be directed towards social and 
economic infrastructure needed for sustained economic growth. In spending 
mineral revenues Botswana has followed a self-discipline fiscal rule, the Sustainable 
Budget Index (SBI). Under the SBI mineral revenue is supposed to finance 
“development expenditure”, defined as investment and recurrent spending on 
education and health (McFerson 2009b: 1544, Limi 2006: 10). Other recurrent 
spending is funded from non-mineral revenues. According to Limi (2006: 10) the 
SBI has been followed for decades but there are instances where there has been 
some departures. These departures seem to have resulted in a large fiscal deficit 
between 2001 and 2003 (Limi 2006: 10). 
Colonial rule left Botswana with hardly any social infrastructure-few schools and 
hospitals. In 1972, about 88% of the locals who were employed in the formal 
sector had primary education or less (Poteete 2009: 559). Investment in education 
preceded the flow of diamond rents, demonstrated by the establishment of 252 
schools in the 1960s (Ministry of Education 2004 cited in Poteete 2009: 559). By 
2004, the government had invested heavily in education through the establishment 
a network of public schools. According to the Central Statistics Office (CSO 2006 
cited in Poteete 2009: 559) of Botswana, by 2004 there was a network of public 
schools that included 711 primary schools, 210 junior secondary schools and 23 
senior secondary schools. By 2008 the number of primary schools had reached 750 
(CSO 2010). The primary schools have a teaching force of about 12000 (Ministry 
of Education 2006 cited in Poteete 2009: 559). Education expenditure is among 
the highest in the world, at around 9% of GDP and includes the provision of 
nearly universal and free primary education (Word Bank 2016) 
Huge investments have been made in health as well. The latest data covers the 
period between 1998 and 2006. Over this period, the number of clinics increased 
from 225 in 1998 to 263 in 2006 and health posts from 323 in 1998 to 342 in 2006, 
which is an increase of 14.4% and 5.5%, respectively (CSO 2016). Mobile stops 
increased from 740 in 1998 to 860 in 2006 (CSO 2016). The number of hospitals 
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has increased from 16 in 1998 to 17 in 2006 CSO 2016. The ratio of nurses 
increased from 27.1 in 1998 to 28.8 in 2006 per 10,000 populations. The ratio of 
doctors also increased from 2.7 to 3.1, followed by a dramatic drop to 2.0 in 2004 
and an increase in 2006 to 3.3 doctors per 10,000 populations (CSO 2016).  
  
Reserves and Investment 
 
Large mineral export receipts are normally considered a benefit but can make 
macroeconomic management very challenging. Most resource rich countries fall 
into the trap of increasing expenditure during boom periods. Governments that 
increase spending when there is a boom are unable to cut expenditures when the 
boom ends. Consequently, they resort to borrowing in order to maintain the 
spending levels of the boom period. As a result they incur significant debt. 
Botswana has been fortunate in this instance because diamond prices have been 
more stable as compared to other commodities such as oil. Due to the stable rent 
stream it has contributed to Botswana’s revenue management success (Pegg 2010: 
15). Yet, beyond having a stable rent stream a resource rich country needs other 
policies that guide the accumulation of reserves and making domestic or external 
investments. According to Lewis (1989: 1594) countries that have been successful 
in managing their resource wealth have followed counter-cyclical policies. These 
are prudent or conservative policies meant to accumulate reserves and to stabilise 
the growth of domestic expenditures. However, domestic expenditures or 
investment and accumulation of reserves also depend of the absorption capacity of 
the economy.  
Policies or institutions are essential for efficient and effective domestic absorption 
of the rents. According to Auty (2001: 80) three institutions are important in this 
regard: a capital development fund to identify the capital component of the rents 
and sterilise the capital inflows (and curb Dutch Disease effects), a revenue 
stabilisation fund to buffer the revenues that are absorbed via public expenditure 
from price shocks and a project evaluation unit to improve the efficiency of public 
sector investment. In addition, the government of a mineral economy needs to 
divide the mineral rents into an income component and a capital component (Auty 
2001: 80). The capital component is the amount that must be invested annually, 
either domestically or overseas, to maintain the income component of the rent 
stream in perpetuity for future generations (Auty 2001: 80). Botswana has managed 
to establish revenue stabilisation fund and a project evaluation unit. The Revenue 
Stabilization Fund was established in 1972 to accumulate reserves during booms 
that could later be used to cushion downturns (Pegg 2010: 16). By saving the 
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revenue the government has been able to maintain a relatively constant growth rate 
in real expenditures over time. Arguably. The MFDP has acted as a project 
evaluation unit as discussed above.  
The government has always been aware of the weak domestic absorption capacity. 
According to Pegg (2010:16) when the government recognized that the diamond 
revenues would exceed the domestic absorptive capacity, the Public Debt Service 
Fund was established in 1972 that would facilitate the saving of revenues rather 
than contribute to economic overheating by spending it. Again this enabled the 
government to keep expenditure growth below the rate of revenue growth (Hill 
1990). The strategy of investing in reserves has to be linked to the timing of 
domestic investment or the rate of domestic absorption at certain point in time. 
Investment in reserves is usually highly liquid and can be allocated to domestic 
investment if the domestic absorptive capacity changes (Hill 1991: 1192). 
Domestic absorptive capacity can be improved if the economy is much more 
diversified and there are opportunities for entrepreneurs to make productive 
investment using loans provided by the government. Again this highlights the need 
for Botswana to diversify the economy.  
Another concern about increased domestic investment has to do with the 
uncertainty associated with booms. Increased development expenditure during a 
boom period commits governments to recurrent expenditure in the future (Hill 
1991: 1192-1193). The future recurrent expenditure also depends on future 
revenue, which in turn depends on whether there is a stable revenue stream. If the 
revenue is unstable and constrained the future recurrent expenditure meant to 
support past development expenditure might not be adequate and domestic 
investments will not yield the expected rate of return (Hill 1991: 1993). Due to this 
uncertainty it makes investment in reserves much more attractive relative to 
domestic investment. However, investment in reserves might postpone the 
diversification of the economy or creation of skills that will be essential for the 
economy in the long run. Botswana has attempted to strike a balance between 
investing in reserves or in domestic development expenditure. This is exemplified 
by its use of the SBI discussed above. In addition, investment strategy has helped 
to produce development through mineral booms and a very low debt service 
burden. However, more strategies are required to ensure diversification of the 
economy.  
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CHAPTER FIVE.NAMIBIA: THE PITFALLS OF A DOMINANT 
PARTY SYSTEM 
 
BACKGROUND 
Namibia gained its independence on 21 March 1990, which was preceded by the 
first democratic elections for the Constituent Assembly as supervised by the 
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Since the first National 
Assembly elections held in November 1994, SWAPO has won all elections. It has 
managed to win with at least 75% of the votes cast. Forged in the anti-colonial and 
anti-apartheid struggle, SWAPO’s formation was driven by the workers movement. 
Namibian contract workers in Cape Town established the Ovambo Peoples 
Congress (OPC) in 1957 and OPC’s aim was to fight the exploitative labour 
contract system and policies of the South West Africa Native Labour Association 
(SWANLA) (SWAPO 2016). Two years later, in 1959, Sam Nujoma and Jacob 
Kuhangua established the Ovamboland Peoples Organization (OPO). The Herero 
Chiefs Council under Chief Hosea Kutako established the South West African 
National Union (SWANU), which the leaders of OPO joined to broaden and 
strengthen the nationalist movement (SWAPO 2016). The gradual amalgamation 
of different social movements resulted in the formation of SWAPO and shows 
that it is broad based movement, hence its dominance in Namibia’s political 
landscape. 
 
Coming out of an apartheid system, the society was extremely unequal along racial 
and ethnic lines. Therefore, wealth distribution has been an important issue since 
independence. From independence, Namibia has enjoyed a fairly stable economic 
performance driven mainly by the mining sector. Mining is a critical sector of the 
Namibian economy and mineral assets form a major source of national wealth. As 
a result, the mining sector is viewed by the government as an essential component 
to long-term development. Historically, the country has depended primarily on 
diamond exports as a major source of foreign exchange earnings and revenues. 
The contribution of diamond mining to government revenue has over the years 
marginally declined. There has been a steady, but progressive decline in the 
contribution of diamonds to the national income in relation to the other sectors of 
the economy. In 1994, De Beers operations in Namibia were renamed NamDeb 
Diamond Corporation (NamDeb) and it became a 50-50 joint venture with the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia (GoRN). There is a confidential sales 
agreement between De Beers and the Government which determines the share of 
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profits that each receives (Boer and Sherbourne 2004: 6). This brief background 
provides a platform to discuss the institutional context of Namibia.  
 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
The first case study provided the key arguments on the importance of institutions 
of restraint. This chapter’s main objective is to compare democratic institutions, 
insulated and autonomous bureaucracy and CDPIs. The attempt is to assess 
whether democratic institutions have been decisive in Namibia or there is similar 
trend where a CDPI plays the central role in providing the necessary restraints. 
Fortunately the WGI indicators begin from 1996 just a few years after Namibia 
attained its independence and 2 years after the first democratic elections. 
Namibia has heavily relied on constitutionalism to ensure that the government or 
ruling elites exercise power in a manner that benefits society. The dominance of 
SWAPO has however allowed it to have influence on state institutions (Melber 
2010: 37). Moreover, the dominance of SWAPO has given it legal authorisation 
not only to govern alone, but also to change the Constitution single-handedly. This 
has had implications on democratic institutions and other institutions essential for 
the management of resource rents and the economy.  
Rule of Law 
In recent years the dominance of SWAPO has caused some worrying behaviour 
that is against the spirit of rule of law. Political elites within SWAPO have 
occasionally expressed frustration over court rulings they deem to be against their 
political-ideological stance. According to Melber (2010: 39) at times some court 
rulings have not been met with respect. In addition, the rule of law was implicitly 
viewed as the law of the ruling elites (Melber 2010: 39). For instance, the tense 
political environment in the build up to the National Assembly and Presidential 
election in November 2009 witnessed a tendency among the political elite to call 
for the change of laws according to the desires of those in power and control 
(Melber 2010: 39). Rule of law requires a judiciary sufficiently independent of 
political influence from the parliament or the executive to ensure that the country 
is governed according to the principles enshrined in the constitution.  
One area that reflects whether rule of law is robust is how the government deals 
with official corruption. According to Amoo and Skeffer (2006: 34) in Namibia, 
corruption is a problem perceived to be on the increase. In 2003, the legislature 
responded with the promulgation of the Anti-corruption Act. Through the Act an 
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Anti-corruption Commission was established in February 2006. This was a notable 
act but weaknesses still remain. For instance, the robustness of rule of law is 
questionable as investigations into major cases proceed slowly (KPMG 2014: 9). In 
the public sector, Links and Haimbodi (2011: 4) argue that political considerations 
could be reason why the pace to deal with corruption or graft has been slow. Table 
7 and Figure 8 below shows how Namibia performed on rule law between 1996 
and 2014.  
Table 7. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator Country Year No 
Sources 
Governance 
Scores (-2.5 
to+2.5) 
Percentile 
Rank (0-100) 
Standard 
Error 
Rule of Law Namibia 1996 5 0.20 57.42 0.21 
  1998 7 0.20 58.37 0.21 
  2000 7 0.20 57.89 0.17 
  2002 10 0.26 59.81 0.17 
  2003 10 0.25 60.77 0.17 
  2004 11 0.00 52.15 0.16 
  2005 11 -0.07 51.67 0.15 
  2006 10 0.14 56.46 0.15 
  2007 11 0.12 56.46 0.16 
  2008 12 0.37 60.10 0.15 
  2009 14 0.22 61.14 0.14 
  2010 13 0.19 60.66 0.14 
  2011 13 0.17 60.09 0.14 
  2012 13 0.24 60.19 0.14 
  2013 14 0.26 59.72 0.14 
  2014 13 0.14 62.98 0.15 
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Figure 8. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
 
An assessment of Table 7 and Figure 8 show that over the period studied, rule of 
law has not really changed or improved significantly. Rather, it could be a 
reflection of some of the issues that were discussed above which include political 
considerations in dealing with corruption and the slowness to investigate cases. 
Without taking corruption seriously, the government is creating an environment 
that is conducive for corruption to occur without being checked. In addition, 
corruption will undermine the rule of law and the complementary institutions that 
are meant to deal with it. From the analysis it is safe to conclude that rule of law is 
not robust enough to make resource management easier in Namibia.  
 
Transparency and Accountability 
 
It has been noted that SWAPO has an overwhelming support in society. This was 
usually the case in most post-colonial societies. Liberation movements in SSA have 
tended to possess huge popular support that waned with time due to various 
reasons, but some included corruption and mismanagement of the economy. 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) in Zimbabwe and 
the United National Independence Party in Zambia are instances where liberation 
movements have dominated their respective political landscapes but support 
diminished with time. This dominance has implications on the democratic system 
Namibia, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law
Individual Indicators used to construct Rule of Law
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADB African Development Bank CPIA http://cpia.afdb.org/ .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.83
ASD Asian Development Bank CPIA http://www.adb.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. 0.75 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.73
CCR Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.44 0.34 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
FRH Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.57 0.52 0.61 0.46 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.62 0.66 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.55
GII Global Integrity http://www.globalintegrity.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.60 0.63
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.70
HER Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom http://www.heritage.org 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
HUM CIRI Human Rights Database http://www.humanrightsdata.com 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 ..
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.43 0.43 .. .. .. 0.53 .. .. .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.63 0.63 0.63
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments http://www.worldbank.org .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
TPR US State Department Trafficking in People report http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
VAB Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer Survey http://www.lapopsurveys.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WJP World Justice Project http://www.worldjusticeproject.org.  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WMO IHS Global Insight Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.67
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as a whole. As highlighted in Chapter Four, elections alone are inadequate in 
ensuring that ruling elites are accountable and exercise their power in a transparent 
manner.  
 
In the first elections after independence ten political parties participated. These 
included Aksie Christelik Nasionaal (ACN), Christian Democratic Action for 
Social Justice (CDA), Democratic Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia (DTA), Federal 
Convention of Namibia (FCN), Namibia National Democratic Party (NNDP), 
Namibia National Front (NNF), Namibia Patriotic Front (NPF), SWAPO-
Democrats (SWAPO-D), SWAPO of Namibia (SWAPO), and United Democratic 
Front of Namibia (UDF) (Geingob 2010: 87). However, only seven parties won 
seats: SWAPO 41, DTA 21, UDF 4, ACN 3, and NPF, and FCN and NNF 1 each. 
The Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) emerged after SWAPO split. Since 
independence the National Assembly has consisted of 72 elected members and 6 
non-voting members appointed by the President. As a result of the constitutional 
amendments passed in 2014, the National Assembly now has 96 elected members 
and 8 non-voting members appointed by the President (IPPR 2014). Table 8 below 
shows the number of seats different parties won from 1990 to 2014.  
 
Table 8. Share of seats in National Assembly since (1990 -2014) 
 		
 
Source: Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2014) and Electoral Commission of Namibia 
(ECN) (2014) 
 
 
Year/Party 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
ACN/MAG 3 1 1 1 -  
APP - - - - 1 2 
CoD - - 7 5 1  
DTA 21 15 7 4 2 5 
FCN 1 - - - -  
NNF 1 - - - -  
NPF/DCN 1 1 - - -  
NUDO - - - 3 2 2 
RDP - - - - 8 3 
RP - - - 1 1 1 
SWANU - - - - 1 1 
SWAPO 41 53 55 55 54 77 
UDF 4 2 2 3 2 2 
WRP      2 
UPM      1 
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In the 2014 elections SWANU of Namibia, the United People’s Movement  
(UPM) and the Republican Party (RP) did not initially win any seats in the general 
elections. However, they each obtained 1 seat through the application of the 
surplus votes system (ECN 2014: 45). The results show that SWAPO is a 
dominant force and electoral competition is very limited. This was the case in 
Botswana for the first 20 years after independence.  
A few irregularities have been reported in some elections but these were related to 
poor handling of tendered votes and the slowness in announcing elections results. 
Most international observers have judged that elections since independence have 
been free and fair. This suggests that the electorate is free to choose a government 
of their choice (Tötemeyer 2010: 288). As argued in Chapter Four, elections are 
just a once off event and for accountability and transparency to exist public 
participation is crucial. The arrival of the RDP which became the official 
opposition in the National Assembly in 2009, has been accompanied with political 
intolerance and even sporadic violence ahead of the November 2009 National 
Assembly and Presidential elections (Links 2010). However, the political landscape 
is generally accommodative to opposition parties.  
In terms of participation by citizens, Namibians tend to be passive. Hopwood 
(2012: 1) suggests that most Namibians are too passive when it comes to socio-
political issues. To this effect, Hopwood (2010: 1) suggest that some sections of 
the population think that to show allegiance to the ruling party they should not be 
outspoken and others are cautious that they might not receive benefits if they 
criticize the government. Even academics tend not to participate or give views on 
certain issues. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the National Assembly 
is disconnected from the electorate because of the party list system that emphasises 
party loyalty above accountability of the elected (Hopwood 2012: 2). These are 
some of the instances that suggest that democratic mechanisms for making the 
ruling elites accountable and transparent are weak. In sum, it is apparent that 
electoral competition does not prompt ruling elites to abide by principles of 
transparency and accountability; therefore it has to be accompanied by continuous 
and constant participation of the citizens in socio-political issues.  
Table 9 and Figure 9 below show that voice and accountability is not robust in 
Namibia. This is similar to Botswana where it has generally been decreasing. What 
this illustrates is that, regardless of the existence of democratic space other factors 
can inhibit the electorate from consistently participating in socio-political issues. 
Hopwood (2012: 2) argues that in Namibia there is plenty of democratic space that 
 62	
is not being utilised for the reasons outlined above. Without scrutinising the 
actions of the ruling elite it becomes easier for various agents to engage in 
corruption, rent-seeking and patronage because accountability and transparency are 
not part of the political system. 
 
 
Table 9. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Voice and Accountability 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator Country Year No 
Sources 
Governance 
Scores (-2.5 
to+2.5) 
Percentile 
Rank (0-
100) 
Standard 
Error 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Namibia 1996 5 0.49 63.94 0.22 
  1998 5 0.28 57.69 0.23 
  2000 6 0.31 57.69 0.21 
  2002 10 0.23 54.33 0.16 
  2003 10 0.22 53.37 0.16 
  2004 11 0.32 57.69 0.15 
  2005 13 0.37 59.62 0.13 
  2006 12 0.48 61.06 0.13 
  2007 13 0.45 59.62 0.13 
  2008 13 0.44 59.62 0.13 
  2009 15 0.37 58.29 0.13 
  2010 14 0.35 58.29 0.13 
  2011 14 0.35 58.22 0.13 
  2012 14 0.37 58.29 0.12 
  2013 15 0.39 59.24 0.12 
  2014 12 0.54 66.50 0.13 
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Figure 9. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Voice and Accountability 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
 
INSULATED AND AUTONOMOUS BUREAUCRACY 
The ruling party in Namibia decided to rapidly localise the bureaucracy. The 
localisation did not result in the replacement of the colonial bureaucrats with 
competent local technocrats. It was done on the basis of political patronage. Links 
and Haimbodi (2011: 4) argue that the reality in the bureaucracy and SOCs is that 
appointment processes have been politicised since SWAPO took over power. 
From the start SWAPO has sought to have a strong influence over state processes, 
including policy-making (Links and Haimbodi 2011: 4). As a result, high ranking 
and influential positions in the bureaucracy are occupied with SWAPO supporters 
or individuals who are linked to the ruling party. Links and Haimbodi (2011: 4) 
suggest that the situation is such that political and in some cases even personal 
affiliation and connectedness have consistently trumped experience, skills and 
expertise. This entails that even positions that need technocrats, such as permanent 
secretaries, have been politicised. This is contrary to the approach that the BDP 
adopted after independence. Due to these dynamics it is safe to conclude that the 
bureaucracy in Namibia is not insulated and autonomous from political influence. 
Namibia, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Voice & Accountabillity
Individual Indicators used to construct Voice & Accountability
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.75
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77
CCR Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
FRH Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.54 0.52 0.61 0.43 0.53 0.52 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.51
GII Global Integrity http://www.globalintegrity.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.54 0.58
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.81
HUM CIRI Human Rights D tabase http://www.humanrightsdata.com 0.88 0.69 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.50 ..
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.49 0.51 .. .. .. 0.57 .. .. .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.75
IRP IREEP African Electoral Index http://www.ireep.org .. .. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MSI IREX Media Sustainability Index http://www.irex.org .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.73 0.73 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.64 ..
OBI International Budget Project Open Budget Index http://www.internationalbudget.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 0.92 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
RSF Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index http://www.rsf.org .. .. .. 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.88
VAB Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer Survey http://www.lapopsurveys.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WJP World Justice Project http://www.worldjusticeproject.org.  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WMO IHS Global Insigh  Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 ..
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Accordingly, one can surmise that policymaking related to management of 
resource rents can easily be influenced by political elites.  
 
Other developments that suggest that SWAPO wants a strong influence on state 
process occurred in 2007 when the RDP was founded. This provoked an 
antagonistic and hostile political climate that contributed to SWAPO’s growing 
intolerance of criticism, and has prompted the ruling elite to use its dominance to 
change the rules and seek political compliance among all higher ranks of the public 
service (Melber 2010: 39). Civil servants would be directly answerable to the ruling 
party and its political agenda, and not to an oath taken to serve the wider interest 
of society (Melber 2010: 39). This places the independence of the bureaucracy 
under threat. As highlighted above, political appointments in the bureaucracy have 
followed a patrimonial logic. The introduction of a patrimonial logic into the 
bureaucracy has allowed corruption to occur without being checked (An issue 
discussed below). With a bureaucracy affected by patrimonialism and corruption, it 
is possible that the functioning of other institutions that are responsible for 
crafting and implementation of policies have been undermined. Consequently, this 
has negative affected government effectiveness. 
 
CENTRALISED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING INSTITUTIONS 
In the discussion on Botswana, the MFDP played the role of a CDPI in a context 
in which the bureaucracy was insulated and autonomous. With a bureaucracy that 
is heavily influenced by the political interests of the ruling party, Namibia’s 
institutions that are supposed to be functioning as CDPIs might be weak. On the 
one hand, the scant literature that exists on policy-making and institutions 
responsible for polices point to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) as the institutions that steer economic policy making. 
The policy framework is designed by the MOF with assistance of the NPC, Bank 
of Namibia (BON) and the Department of Public Service Management in the 
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) (NCCI and NDI 1997: 13). Line Ministries 
discuss their interests including their budgets estimates with the MOF and the 
NPC (NCCI and NDI 1997: 13). The National Planning Commission Secretariat 
(NPCS) is responsible for the detailed macroeconomic modeling of the economy 
and this process is further coordinated and advanced by the Macroeconomic 
Working Group (MWD), a technical think tank of the MOF, NPCS and BON 
(IMF 2008: 14). The MWD seems to provide technical support and functions 
within the parameters set by the interests of the ruling party.  
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On the other hand, the Ministry of Trade and Industry drive areas such as 
industrial policy (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2012). These are areas that should 
be driven by a CDPI which was the case in most Asian developmental states. 
Other examples that have emerged from newspaper articles in Namibia that 
suggest that there is no overarching institution (like the MFDP in Botswana) that 
presides over the synchronisation of policy making has to do with role of 
Permanent Secretaries. The Permanent Secretaries in their capacity as accounting 
officers of ministries are running the affairs of their ministries as if they were their 
own private companies (Tjirimejo 2007). Tjirimejo (2007) adds that these 
Permanent Secretaries have acquired powers even feared by the ruling elite. 
Loopholes in the appointments, job appraisals, and evaluation of performance and 
monitoring of senior government officials have created favourable conditions for 
corruption in government (Tjirimejo 2007). From the discussion, it is quite difficult 
to pinpoint the institution(s) that can be equated to a CDPI as in the case of 
Botswana’s MFDP. Comparatively, one can surmise that Namibia’s apparatus is 
more decentralised and does not necessarily have a CDPI. Table 10 and Figure 10 
show how Namibia performs on government effectiveness. 
 
Table 10. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness 
	
 
 
 
Indicator Country Year No 
Sources 
Governance 
Scores (-2.5 
to+2.5) 
Percentile 
Rank (0-
100) 
Standard 
Error 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Namibia 1996 3 0.51 69.27 0.25 
  1998 5 0.21 61.46 0.20 
  2000 5 0.17 60.98 0.21 
  2002 8 0.13 61.46 0.17 
  2003 8 0.24 63.90 0.17 
  2004 9 0.10 62.44 0.17 
  2005 9 0.04 56.59 0.17 
  2006 8 0.12 59.02 0.18 
  2007 9 0.13 58.25 0.19 
  2008 9 0.20 60.68 0.19 
  2009 11 0.13 58.85 0.18 
  2010 10 0.11 58.37 0.19 
  2011 10 0.09 57.82 0.19 
  2012 10 0.13 59.81 0.19 
  2013 11 0.20 60.29 0.18 
  2014 11 0.10 58.65 0.19 
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Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
Figure 10. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
Table 10 and Figure 10 above show that government effectiveness in Namibia has 
been on a decrease. With appointment of unqualified people into technical 
positions and the lack of oversight one can infer that Namibia has not performed 
very well in this dimension. In addition, although speculative, the decentralised 
nature of the bureaucracy could be contributing to corruption to take place and 
patron-client relations to develop.  
 
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
The previous sections discussed the institutional profile of Namibia; this section 
attempts to make links between the institutions of restraint that exist and the 
economic outcomes. What came out of the discussion on institutions of restraint 
in Namibia is that the dominance of SWAPO has had a negative effect on 
democratic institutions and their robustness. In addition, the ruling party seems to 
have control over state processes, which has resulted in a weak bureaucracy 
without a “pocket of efficiency” in the form of a CDPI. The discussion in Chapter 
Four demonstrated some of the ways in which the efficiency of the bureaucracy 
Namibia, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness
Individual Indicators used to construct Government Effectiveness
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADB African Development Bank CPIA http://cpia.afdb.org/ .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77
ASD Asian Development Bank CPIA http://www.adb.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. 0.44 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.68
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.48
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.60
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.50 0.50 .. .. .. 0.60 .. .. .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.58
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments http://www.worldbank.org .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 0.88 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WMO IHS Global Insight Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.78
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and particularly how the MFDP in Botswana provided restraints. Therefore, does 
the absence of a CDPI in Namibia explain some of the economic outcomes?  
 
Control of Corruption, Rent-Seeking and Patronage 
 
From a theoretical perspective it is possible for dominant party systems to have 
higher or low levels of corruption. On one hand a dominant party can be politically 
secure and is not compelled to maintain its power by providing patronage or 
turning a blind eye on corruption and rent-seeking. On the other hand, in a 
dominant party system, accountability can be weak if the party has an 
overwhelming majority in the parliament and controls the civil service. This 
suggests that controlling corruption is a matter of political will. The latter case 
appears to be the case in Namibia. When corruption had become a problem in 
government and in SOCs the response was to establish an ACC. However, the 
work of the commission has been unimpressive. In part, this can be attributed to 
the weakness of the rule of law and some of the individuals involved are politically 
connected to the ruling party. Tjirimejo (2007) argued that corruption in Namibia 
is a network that stretched from the upper ranks of the government to lower 
levels. This suggests that the political system and state apparatus provides 
opportunities and incentives for corrupt activities to occur. Relatedly, due to the 
dominance of SWAPO, the institutions meant to deal with corruption could be 
deliberately weakened.  
 
Corruption is a problem in Namibia’s state organs and SOCs. Transparency and 
accountability remains weak in most state organs and those who preside over these 
organs are not being held accountable for how they handle state resources (Links 
2010, NID 2006). Tjirimejo (2007) echoes similar sentiments by arguing that some 
Permanent Secretaries do not even know how the budget allocations to their 
Ministries were spent, to the extent of over-expenditure and unaccountable funds 
running into millions of Namibian dollars. Individuals within different ministries 
have created their own networks to suck state resources, as there is no oversight 
from above. In addition, the lack of oversight from the ruling elites has created a 
bureaucracy where basic management principles such as transparency, efficiency 
and effectiveness are not the norm (Tjirimejo 2007). Accordingly, this has 
undermined the state apparatus, which is responsible for implementation policies 
and ensuring effective and efficient use of resources.  
 
SOCs play a significant role in provision of public goods and infrastructure 
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development that is essential for economic performance. Therefore, performance 
of the sector can be used to assess the overall performance of the economy. SOCs 
are another area where corruption is rampant in Namibia. There has been an 
increase in SOCs since independence. In 1990 there were about 12, over 45 by 
2003 and the Enterprise Act of 2006 lists 52 (Links and Haimbodi 2011: 1). This is 
in contrast to Botswana where the MFDP has restricted the increase of SOCs, as 
they can be a burden to the economy and a site of corrupt activities. Links and 
Haimbodi (2011: 1) argue that the sector has been plague by poor management, 
non-accountability and non-transparency, which have been accompanied by 
political interference. In the period of 2008 to 2009 117 cases of alleged corruption 
were recorded and SOCs accounted for 22% of the cases (NDI 2009). These are 
signs that corruption is indeed a problem in Namibia’s political economy. The 
situation is compounded by political patronage that exists in the SOCs as discussed 
earlier. What is clear is that poor oversight and under regulation have facilitated 
corruption to be prevalent. In contrast, the MFDP in Botswana has provided 
oversight over the operations of state organs and companies. Arguably, this has 
curbed corruption, rent-seeking and patronage.  
In the review of the literature it was established that in some cases corruption 
could occur in the early phases of natural resource development. With corruption 
beginning in the exploration natural resources it provides opportunities for such 
activities to continue into the mining and the management of resource rents. 
According to Links (2012: 1) there have been serious signs of corrupt activities in 
the exploration and mining/production licencing that can become a threat to the 
future prospects for the extractive sector itself and the economy as a whole. 
SWAPO deliberately blurred the line between state and party and this has resulted 
in contracts, licences and concessions being allocated to those who are politically 
connected (Al Jazeera 2014). Blurring of party and state, accompanied by political 
dominance of SWAPO has arguably been the main driver of corruption in 
Namibia.  
 
Rent-seeking is increasingly becoming a problem in the natural resource sector. 
This is compounded by the fact that the mineral policy in Namibia has opened up 
the sector to the participation of the private players. In the mineral policy the 
government has recognized that exploration and development of mineral wealth is 
best undertaken by the private sector. The potential discovery of offshore oil has 
already resulted in politically connected individuals strategically positioning 
themselves to gain rents when oil extraction begins (Links and Haimbodi 2011: 2). 
In other cases locals with no experience or expertise in exploration and extraction 
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of oil and gas, apply for and are granted licences, under the pretext of securing 
some sort of local ownership of natural resources (Links and Haimbodi 2011: 2). 
In addition, the locals have sold completely or part of their licences to foreign 
companies to make a quick profit (Links and Haimbodi 2011: 2). Hence, one can 
conclude that corruption, rent-seeking of various sorts and patronage have 
penetrated Namibia’s political economy.  
Table 11 and Figure 11 show how Namibia has performed in terms of control of 
corruption. Table 11 and Figure 11 show that control of corruption has been 
decreasing over the years. The principal reason is the dominance of SWAPO that 
has created incentives and provided an environment for politicians and other 
agents to engage in corruption, rent-seeking and patronage, which reinforce each 
other.  
 
Table 11. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption 
 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better 
governance scores. 
 
 
 
Indicator Country Year No 
Sources 
Governance 
Scores (-2.5 
to+2.5) 
Percentile 
Rank (0-
100) 
Standard 
Error 
Control of 
Corruption 
Namibia 1996 3 0.71 77.07 0.30 
  1998 5 0.59 72.20 0.20 
  2000 5 0.47 70.24 0.24 
  2002 7 -0.04 56.59 0.18 
  2003 8 0.18 60.49 0.19 
  2004 9 0.12 59.02 0.17 
  2005 9 0.18 60.49 0.18 
  2006 8 0.17 60.98 0.18 
  2007 9 0.26 65.05 0.18 
  2008 9 0.56 73.30 0.18 
  2009 11 0.25 66.03 0.16 
  2010 10 0.32 67.14 0.17 
  2011 10 0.29 66.35 0.17 
  2012 10 0.29 65.07 0.16 
  2013 11 0.28 64.59 0.16 
  2014 11 0.23 58.65 0.16 
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Figure 11. Namibia, 1996-2014, Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption 	
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2016): The line graph includes margins of error shown as dashed 
lines. 
 
Economic Performance. 
The extraction and processing of minerals for export remains Namibia’s main 
growth driver. This is despite of the relative decline in mining’s contribution to 
GDP in recent years. In 2012, the mining sector generated USD 1.2 billion of 
value added, contributed 37% of total export earnings, and about 10% of total 
public revenue (AfDB 2014: 2). Since independence the economy has performed 
very well. GDP growth has exhibited considerable fluctuations, having averaged 
3.1% between 1998-2001 (African Economic Outlook 2012: 407). The annual real 
GDP growth rate during between 2002 and 2008 was strong, averaging 5.0% 
(AfDB 2014: 2). However, growth contracted by 1.1% in 2009, due to a dramatic 
decline in the demand for minerals (particularly diamonds) (AfDB 2014: 2). 
Growth recovered strongly to 6.0% and 4.9% in 2010 and 2011, respectively 
(AfDB 2014: 2). Real GDP growth has remained robust as it was estimated at 
5.0% in 2012 (AfDB 2014: 2). In 2014 growth accelerated to 5.3% from 5.1% in 
2013 (Phiri and Odhiambo 2015: 2). Growth improved to 5.6% in 2015 and is 
expected to improve to about 6.4% in 2016 as external demand for minerals 
increase; and new mines start production and exporting (Phiri and Odhiambo 
Namibia, 1996-2014
Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption
Individual Indicators used to construct Control of Corruption
Code Source Website 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADB African Development Bank CPIA http://cpia.afdb.org/ .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
AFR Afrobarometer http://www.afrobarometer.org .. .. .. 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.71
ASD Asian Development Bank CPIA http://www.adb.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ .. .. .. .. 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
CCR Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit http://www.eiu.com 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
FRH Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GCB Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Survey http://www.transparency.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey http://www.weforum.org .. .. .. 0.56 0.51 0.59 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.46
GII Global Integrity http://www.globalintegrity.org/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.25 0.35
GWP Gallup World Poll http://www.gallupworldpoll.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.33
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments http://www.ifad.org .. .. .. .. .. 0.53 0.53 .. .. .. 0.60 .. .. .. .. ..
IPD Institutional Profiles Database http://www.cepii.fr/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
LBO Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments http://www.worldbank.org .. NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
PRC Political Economic Risk Consultancy Corruption in Asia http://www.asiarisk.com/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide http://www.prsgroup.com 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
VAB Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer Survey http://www.lapopsurveys.org .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WCY IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook http://www.imd.ch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WJP World Justice Project http://www.worldjusticeproject.org.  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WMO IHS Global Insight Country Risk Rating http://www.globalinsight.com 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.67
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2015: 2).  Figure 12 below shows the growth rate trend from 1990 to 2015.  
Figure 12: Namibia Annual GDP growth rate (1990–2010) 
	
 
Namibia has made some positive progress in diversifying the economy but it is 
inadequate to offset the economy’s dependence on the mineral sector (see Table 
12). The mining sector’s contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) shrunk 
from about 47% in 1978 to 19.6% by 1990 and reached 11.3% in 2012 (AfDB 
2014: 2). The manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP increased from 5.3% in 
1990 to 11.3% in 2012, mainly due to the rapid expansion of fish and meat 
processing and some mineral beneficiation, the areas in which manufacturing 
activities are currently concentrated (AfDB 2014: 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72	
Table 12. Namibia GDP by sector (percentage of GDP at Current prices) 
 
            	
	
Source Phiri and Adhiambo (2015): African Economic Outlook 
 
 
To stimulate diversification of the economy the government established export 
processing zones (EPZ) in 1995 and created special incentives for manufacturing 
companies (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2012). These efforts have to a lesser 
extent produced the intended results (Rieckmann 2008). In its Vision 2030 
Namibia has an ambition of becoming as industrialised nation with high income by 
2030. In line with an industrial policy was developed in 2012. The policy seeks to 
achieve a diversified, inclusive and environment friendly economy driven by value 
addition and innovation. These objectives are outlined in the fourth National 
Development Plan  (NDP 4), which covers the period between 2012 and 2017.  In 
addition, an essential component of NDP 4 is private sector led growth. However, 
weak institutional capacity is hindering the growth and development of business 
enterprises (AfDB 2014: 11). Arguably, the lack of a CDPI that has the technical 
expertise and synchronises policies can be a contributing factor to weak 
institutional capacity. For instance, Brown (2014: 1) argues that some of the 
shortcomings of most budgets over the years is that they have not been 
sychronised with the NDPs. This is just some of the indications of weak 
institutional and technical capacity. Compared to Botswana, Namibia is at a much 
better position to successfully diversify its economy due some previous 
investments made by the apartheid government. What it requires is institutional 
capacity to undergird the process.  
 2009 2013 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting 9.0 61 
of which fishing 4.2 3.1 
Minining and Quarrying 11.8 14.0 
of which oil .. .. 
Manufacturing 14.1 13.2 
Electricity, gas and water 2.2 2.0 
Construction 3.5 4.1 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of vehicles household goods, 
restaurants and hotels 
13.9 13.9 
Transport, storage and communication 5.6 4.8 
Finance, real estate and business services 16.6 15.8 
Public administrations and defence 11.0 13.0 
Other services 12.3 13.0 
Gross domestic product at bascic prices/factor cost 100.0 100.0 
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As in Botswana the mineral driven growth in Namibia has failed to create 
employment or make significant linkages with other sectors of the economy. At 
29.2% in 2013 the unemployment rate remains high and is a reflection of a skills 
mismatch and a weak education and training system that is not responding to the 
needs of an evolving labour market (Phiri and Odhiambo 2015: 11). The youth 
unemployment rate is 41% and unemployment is higher among women (33.1%) 
than men (25.8%) and in rural areas at 30% compared to urban areas at 29% (Phiri 
and Odhiambo 2015: 11). Unemployment for those who have completed junior 
secondary education is 36.6% while for university graduates is 7.2% (Phiri and 
Odhiambo 2015: 11).  
Namibia is considered an upper middle-income country but still faces challenges 
when it comes to reducing poverty. Namibia has made some strides in alleviating 
poverty but the regional or ethnic patterns of poverty still remain. The research 
conducted by the Institute for Public Policy Research written by Schmidt (2009) 
demonstrates this trend. The government has conducted two surveys called 
Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (NHIES) since 
Independence, one in 1993/94 and the other in 2003/04. From the analysis done 
by Schmidt (2009: 3) the number of people living in poverty in Namibia decreased 
from 58% in 1993/94 to 38% in 2003/04. In the same period, poverty was more 
than twice as common in rural as in urban areas. Among the urban population, 
poverty decreased from 31% to 1%, while in rural areas the poverty share dropped 
from 69% to just below 50% (Schmidt 2009: 3). In 2003/04 the highest poverty 
rate was found in Kavango with 64% of the population considered poor and 
Khomas with 8% had the lowest levels of poverty (NSA 2004). All regions with 
the exception of Kavango and Hardap witnessed a decrease in poverty levels. 
Kavango registered an average poverty rate of 58% in 1993/94, which worsened to 
64% by 2003/04 (NSA 2004). Hardap registered no change in its poverty rate of 
42% and Caprivi, Kunene and Oshana registered the largest absolute drop in 
poverty, improving from being some of the poorest regions in 1993/94 to being 
better off than the average in 2003/04 (NSA 2004).  
 
The 2009/10 NHIES survey estimated that around 20% of Namibian households 
are poor, while poor people are estimated to be about 29% of the total population 
(NSA 2010). The poor are disproportionately located in rural areas: mainly 
pensioners, subsistence farmers, households with lower levels of education, and 
women (NSA 2010). Inequality remains high. About 10% of households with the 
lowest adjusted per capita income account for around 2% of total income, while 
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the 10% with the highest adjusted per capita income account for almost 43%. 
(NSA 2010) The Gini coefficient for Namibia is 0.5971 according to results from 
NHIES 2009/2010 compared to 0.603 in 2003/2004 and 0.701 in 1993/1994 
(NSA 2010). This shows that inequality in the distribution of income has slightly 
decreased. Despite this decline the level of inequality in Namibia remains among 
the highest in the world.  
Provision of Public Goods: Education and Health 
 
Guided by the SBI, Botswana reinvests most of its diamond revenues in the 
provision of public goods such as education and health. Contrary to this, Namibia 
does not have a policy that guides investment in public goods. According to 
Rieckmann (2008: 23) Botswana invests significantly larger proportions of the 
revenues generated from diamond exports into education and health services than 
Namibia does. Without having a dedicated policy that guides spending directed 
towards public goods, it can result in sub-standard outcomes. In addition, weak 
institutional capacity is also affecting the quality of public service delivery (AfDB 
2014: 11).  
 
The government has over the years committed considerable funding to education. 
This was crucial since the post independence government inherited an education 
system that was structured along racial and ethnic lines. The constitution provides 
for free education for all learners between the ages of 6 to 16 or learners from 
grade 1 to 10. In line with this, the government has been allocating about 20% of 
the recurrent expenditure towards education, representing a 10% of the GDP 
(Kamupingene 2002: 15, AfDB 2014: 9). According to Sherbourne (2002) from 
1990 to 2002 public spending on education has risen fivefold. As a result, from 
1992 to 2000 the total primary enrolment in government and government-aided 
schools rose from 347 907 to 387 408 (Kamupingene 2002: 8). Primary education 
expenditure increased from N$ 359.7 million in 1992/93 to N$ 936.9 million in 
2000/01 (Kamupingene 2002: 8). This was an increase of the average expenditure 
per primary learner from N$ 1034 in 1992 to N$ 2 421 in 2000 (Kamupingene 
2002: 8).  
From 2001 to 2007 there was an increase from 1545 to 1661 schools, an average 
annual growth of 1.2% (Ministry of Education 2008: 3). About 1562 of these 
schools are state owned. In 2012, there were 1,723 schools, with 24,665 teachers 
and 617,827 children. Overall, there are 25 learners per teacher for primary and 
secondary schools although a small portion (11%) of class groups had more than 
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40 learners (Unicef 2012: 3). Past investments in education have resulted in some 
progress in improving primary education enrolment rates and the adult literacy rate 
(AfDB 2014: 9). Regardless of considerable investment in education, the sector is 
characterized by poor quality outcomes across all segments and has not created the 
skilled workforce Namibia needs to diversify the economy (AfDB 2014: 9). With a 
dedicated plan on how to spend and invest resources Namibia can solve some of 
these problems. 
Since independence, there has been considerable improvement in the public health 
care sector. Due to the apartheid system, the Namibian health system was very 
fragmented (MHSS and NSA 2013: 3). Health facilities were mainly located in the 
urban areas and segregated along racial lines. As such, the government has been 
more responsive to the health needs of the population even though the pace has 
been slow (Janessens et al No date: 2). There has been a significant increase in the 
coverage of and access to health and social welfare services. The current healthcare 
network consists of nearly 1500 health and social welfare service points (MHSS 
and WHO 2010: 4). The area of coverage of a health facility has more than tripled 
as a result of the number of health facilities rising from 98 in 1981 to 317 by 2001 
(SEEN 2001). Recent data show that Namibia has about 269 clinics, 44 health 
centres, 1150 outreach points, three intermediate hospitals, one national referral 
hospital and various social welfare service points (MHSS and NSA 2013: 3). It is 
estimated that public health care facilities serve 85% of the Namibian population 
and is mostly accessed by lower income groups (MHSS and WHO 2010: 4). In 
SSA, Namibia is one of the countries that have the highest expenditures for health. 
Over the period 1993 to 2000, 11% of government spending was earmarked for 
health (MHSS and WHO 2010: 4). The per capita expenditure on health increased 
from $143 in 2001/02 to $276 in 2006/07 (MHSS and WHO 2010: 4).  
Despite an increase in health and social welfare service points, due to remoteness 
and long distances, a huge portion of the population still does not have access to 
health care. According to the 2006/07 Namibia Demographic Health Survey 
(NDHS), 1 in 5 households is within 15 minutes of a government health facility 
and 3 in 5 are within 1 hour of a health facility (MHSS and WHO 2010: 4). 
Significant differences in access exist between urban and rural households. The 
latter are 114 minutes away from the nearest government health facility, whilst the 
former is 25 minutes away (MHSS and WHO 2010: 4). There are 3 health workers 
per 1000 population, which is slightly above the WHO recommendation (MHSS 
and WHO 2010: 4). This number obfuscates the shortage of critical skills in the 
public sector, which has barely two health workers per 1000 population (MHSS 
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and WHO 2010: 4). Within the public health care sector there is chronic shortages 
of doctors and nurses. Consequently, in the long-term Namibia needs to invest 
more or utilise the resources it has effectively.  
Reserves and Investment  
 
Resource driven economic growth and development requires recovery of resource 
rents which are in turn invested in other forms of wealth creating activities capable 
of generating income and employment once minerals are depleted. In short, 
recycling of resource rents is essential. Namibia does not recover most of its 
resource rents as compared to Botswana (Lange 2003: 3). Another area where 
Namibia and Botswana differ is the management of resource revenues. Botswana 
has an explicit policy–the SBI and other funds that have been established over the 
years–that guides reinvestment of all mineral revenues in public infrastructure, 
human capital and foreign financial assets. Namibia has only recognised the 
importance of the sector in terms of its contribution to employment creation and 
economic performance but it has not developed a policy for reinvestment of 
resource rents (Lange 2003: 3). What is currently happening is that resource rents 
are being channeled into recurrent spending instead of being invested in foreign 
assets or investment into domestic revenue generating activities. Only creating 
national wealth by reinvesting resource rents can Namibia initiate long-term 
sustainable development. This is an issue that Namibia has to urgently consider 
when oil rents start flowing.  
 
The comparison between Namibia and Botswana has attempted to reveal the 
differences and similarities in institutions of restraint and the economic outcomes. 
However, it is challenging to link institutional performance with economic 
outcomes. As such, some of the economic outcomes such as performance of the 
economy and the provision of public goods can be affected by factors other than 
the existence or lack thereof of institutions of restraint. As the main objective of 
the paper was to do an institutional study there are few points linked to the 
importance of CDPIs and the centralisation of rents in resource economies that 
are worth discussing before concluding.  These will be discussed in the next short 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX. DISCUSSION POINTS AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
 
 
Discussion Points 
 
The main theme is the previous two chapters revolved around institutions of 
restraint and their importance in the management of resource rents. What emerged 
is that a CDPI, in the case of Botswana, played a central role in providing the 
necessary restraints. However, the lack of a CDPI in Namibia tended to produce 
sub-standard outcomes, particularly in control of corruption and the allocation of 
resources. I want to pick up on this point in this discussion.  
 
From the cases it clear that resource rents are crucial for economic performance 
and provision of public goods. However, one of the main differences between 
Botswana and Namibia is that, Botswana has a centralised mechanism for 
managing resource rents which arguably allowed resource rents to be used more 
efficiently and effectively. The following is a brief discussion on the importance of 
rent centralisation in early capitalist development and for countries attempting to 
diversify the economy; and provide public goods effectively with scarce resources.  
 
It is argued that rent centralisation was pivotal in the capitalist development of the 
Asian developmental states. In addition, rent centralisation was the mechanism 
through which the ruling elites in Asian developmental states were able to monitor 
the recycling of rents and channel them towards productive investment. The 
recycling of rents and investing rents productively resulted in the creation of 
domestic capital that was in turn provided to private entrepreneurs as cheap loans. 
In line with these arguments, there is an emerging literature that seeks to challenge 
orthodoxy on political governance and economic progress in Africa that is relevant 
to discuss before concluding.  
 
As alluded to above, this approach’s starting point is the importance of the 
centralisation of rents in an economy. Rent centralisation is a structure that allows 
ruling elites to determine how rents are (created and) distributed. Generally rents 
are created by extraction of natural or through monopolies by a public or private 
firm in an economy. Kelsall and Booth (2010) argue that, centralisation of the rent 
process in an essential condition for the rents to aid or unlock development. In 
addition, Kelsall and Booth suggest that African ruling elites should develop 
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mechanism of centralising rents if they have an interest in unlocking sustainable 
development. Perhaps centralising of rents is even essential in countries that rely 
on mineral extraction for economic performance and seek to diversify the 
economy away from mineral dependency. As argued in this study a CDPI can be 
one of the institutions contributes to centralisation of rents. For instance, a 
combination of MFDP and Debswana is an instance of a mechanism of rent 
centralisation. However, Kelsall and Booth (2010: 7) caution that rent 
centralisation is not sufficient in and of itself to create conditions for economic 
growth. For instance, the ruling elites in Angola through Sonangol have managed 
to centralise the rent process but it has not led to economic development or 
provision of public goods. Therefore, more needs to be done on the policy level to 
ensure that rents are utilised effectively and efficiently.  
 
In the case of Botswana, the MFDP has been decisive in the formulation and 
implementation of policies on one hand; and effective and efficient in its use of 
resource rents on the other. From the discussion in Chapter Four, one can 
conclude that the BDP has had a long-term view in its use of rents. The BDP’s 
approach is congruent with Kelsall and Booth’s (2010) proposition that the rent 
process must be oriented to the long-term. The long-term orientation entails ruling 
elites (or the state) crafting a strategy that enables them to create rents and 
discipline their utilisation and allocation (Kelsall 2011: 79). In mineral driven 
economies, rents are already available and what is important are institutions that 
craft and implement policies with long-term economic development as the main 
objective. Arguably, this has been the case in Botswana. On one hand rent 
centralisation enables institutions or ruling elites to monitor the use of resource 
rents. On the other hand, it allows spending decisions to be directed by the source 
of the rents. The SBI in Botswana is an instance of spending of resource rents 
being determined by the source of the rents. Contrary to this, Namibia does not 
necessarily have a centralising mechanism. Most of its resource rents have been 
directed into current expenditure and this has been in the form of transfers to 
SOCs. 
 
Chapter Five illustrated how SOCs have become a burden to the economy. The 
general management of SOCs in Namibia if far from efficient and this is 
epitomised by allegations of corruption and mismanagement of resources by senior 
officials. The situation is compounded by the lack of accountability and 
transparency within Namibia’s political economy. Due to these deficiencies it is 
questionable whether channelling a huge amount of resource rents to SOCs is the 
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most effective and efficient way spending and investing resource rents. On the 
macroeconomic level, there seems to be no assessment of the absorption capacity 
of the economy as in Botswana. As a result, resource rents are pumped into the 
economy without taking into account the long-term contribution they can make in 
diversifying the economy. Furthermore, resource rents are not being utilised 
efficiently and effectively and they are not leading to wealth creation through 
productive investments or accumulation of reserves as in the case of Botswana.  
 
What emerges from the discussion above is that with an institution that can 
centralise rents and determine their use, it is possible to control corruption and at 
the same time oversee the allocation of the rents: either towards reserves or 
spending them effectively and efficiently towards provision of public goods. 
Without overstating the role that a CDPI can play, its role in Botswana illustrates 
how it can be essential in resource driven economies and how it can contribute to 
positive economic outcomes. Without a rent centralisation mechanism and a long-
term strategy for the recycling of rents, Namibia can descend into a non-
developmental kleptoracy; a vehicle for the enrichment of those in power. The 
situation is compounded by the dominance of a single party in a political system 
without robust institutions of restraint. Therefore, if oil rents start following, it 
might be essential for Namibia to establish a rent centralising system such as a 
CDPI or reinvent the current institutions such as the NPC or the MOF. In sum, 
restraints will be necessary in the long-term.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
To conclude, let us look at the main arguments of the discussion. When 
considering the interaction of resource rents and institutions, it is worth re-
evaluating the institutions that can be decisive in the management of resource 
rents. The study started on the premise that democracy and its attendant 
institutions have been viewed as adequate in restraining the state or ruling elites 
from plundering resource rents. Relatedly, without an overarching system such as a 
democratic system, it can be difficult for institutions of restrain to emerge. This is 
definitely a reasonable starting point in understanding institutions of restraint. 
However, the experience of Botswana and Namibia raises some questions on the 
adequacy of democratic institutions in providing the necessary restraints.  
It has been illustrated that electoral competition and democratic institutions are 
inadequate in providing restraints. In both cases, elections have been free and fair 
and civil and political rights are to a larger extent respected. Nevertheless, these 
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have not really provided the restraints as predicted by the democratic approach. 
What is apparent is that elections are just once off events and what is essential is 
the continuous participation of the electorate beyond elections. Participation can 
be through scrutinising the actions of those in power, their use of power and the 
policies they formulate and implement. In Namibia, it was illustrated that the 
dominance of the ruling party has had some negative effects on accountability and 
transparency regardless of the existence of an overarching democratic system. In 
addition, the dominance of the ruling party has undermined the rule of law on 
numerous occasions related to corruption and mismanagement. Accordingly, this 
has undermined the functioning of state apparatus and its bureaucracy. Contrary to 
Botswana, corruption, rent-seeking and patronage have largely been checked or 
curbed. However, as the study has demonstrated, to a larger extent its success in 
curbing these practices can be explained by taking into account the role played by 
the MFDP as a CDPI.  
 
It was argued that the capacity of the MFDP to provide restraints is located in the 
bureaucratic structure that is insulated and autonomous from the political elites 
and the society. The autonomy of the bureaucracy has been achieved through a 
merit-based method of recruitment and appointment. As such, the MFDP has 
operated with competence and professionalism. These two attributes in the MFDP 
and the bureaucracy have indirectly provided restraints. In addition, competence 
and professionalism have enabled the MFDP to restrain the pursuit of 
unsustainable policies that are motivated by patronage concerns. Moreover, 
through centralisation of rents, synchronisation of policies and oversight over 
other ministries and SOCs the MFDP has managed to limit corruption in the 
management of resource rents. Therefore, one can conclude that the absence of a 
similar institutional arrangement can explain failure to control corruption, rent-
seeking and patronage in Namibia.  
 
In the main, this study has raised some anomalies about the adequacy of 
democracy and its attendant institutions to provide restraints that are crucial in 
resource economies. This is an important observation considering that most 
resource rich economies do not have robust democratic institutions. The study has 
attempted to provide another avenue through which political economists can 
understand institutions of restraint. In particular, the interaction of resource rents, 
democratic institutions and CDPIs, indicate some interesting analytical 
opportunities for further research into understanding institutions of restraint.  
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